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Abstract 
 
Outsourcing has been utilized as a corporate strategy by U.S. manufacturers for 
over three decades to minimize manufacturing and production costs, focus on core 
competencies and achieve sustained competitive advantages in the global market.  In 
recent years, manufacturers have begun evaluating nearshoring, reshoring and insourcing 
strategies as near-term responses to trigger events such as increased labor costs and 
decreased product quality.  The United States Air Force also established outsourcing as 
its primary strategy for achieving cost-saving objectives associated with the design, 
engineering, manufacturing, production and sustainment of its fourth, fifth and sixth 
generation weapon systems.  In order to decrease weapon system costs and consistently 
achieve congressionally mandated core and 50/50 requirements, the United States Air 
Force is evaluating opportunities to bring outsourced workload into the depot 
infrastructure.  This research applies grounded theory and case study methodologies to 
examine the antecedents and barriers of the U.S. manufacturing outsourcing-to-
insourcing relocation shift.  A structured framework is presented to assist the United 
States Air Force as a guide for evaluating insourcing opportunities.  The framework 
addresses contract duration, access to critical information, and the factors influencing the 
insourcing decision. 
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THE OUTSOURCING-TO-INSOURCING RELOCATION SHIFT: A RESPONSE OF 
U.S. MANUFACTURERS TO THE OUTSOURCING PARADIGM 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
1.1  General Discussion 
For nearly 30 years there has been an escalated focus within industry and 
academia on understanding the outsourcing phenomenon (Hatonen and Eriksson, 2009).  
Outsourcing, defined as the transfer of activities and processes previously conducted 
internally to an external party (Ellram and Billington, 2001) has significantly redefined 
the horizontal boundaries of the firm and, in-turn, the nature of the firm in the market 
place.  Figure 1 taken from Hatonen and Eriksson (2009) provides a summary look at the 
evolution of outsourcing, expecting that outsourcing will continue to evolve as a core 
business strategy well into the future.     
 
Figure 1 - Outsourcing research and future insights (Hatonen and Eriksson, 2009) 
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The lower portion of Figure 1 highlights the transition of focal firm activities to 
outsource service providers.  Outsourcing has been increasingly considered as a critical 
element of organizational strategy (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Antelo and Bru, 2010).  
Over time, the degree to which firms have relied on outsourcing to perform functions 
which directly and indirectly affect overall firm performance has significantly increased 
(Kroes and Ghosh, 2010).  
Although outsourcing has been a long-standing, evolutionary strategy there is 
increasing awareness that the outsourcing cycle may be beginning to decline.  Research 
completed by Mol et al., (2005), Gadde and Jonsson (2007), Fredriksson and Jonsson 
(2009), and Kinkel and Maloca (2009) provide insight into performance consequences 
and risks of outsourcing.  Additionally, Rangan (2000) points out that firms have varying 
abilities to properly identify and evaluate foreign suppliers therefore there is potential that 
the perceived value of outsourcing, particularly sourcing globally, may not achieve the 
firm’s desired objectives.  This suggests that firms may begin reversing the outsourcing 
cycle, creating a monumental outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation shift. 
 
This expected relocation shift is consistent with the work of Fine (2000).  His 
research centers on the speed at which supply chain evolution occurs in industry.  He 
concluded that there are forces at work within both horizontally and vertically integrated 
industries which create pressure for the industry to evaluate its supply chain design—
vertically integrated supply chains face internal and external pressures to become more 
horizontal or disintegrated and horizontally integrated supply chains are pushed toward 
vertical integration.  Fine illustrates this push pressure process as identified in Figure 2 
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below and summarizes “we learn another important lesson about the evolution of supply 
chain structures: They should not be expected to be stable.” 
 
Figure 2 - The Double Helix Curve: Supply Chain Structure Oscillations (Fine, 2000) 
 
Fine’s model in Figure 2 above illustrates the Pressure To Disintegrate and 
Pressure To Integrate supply chain structures from intra- and inter-firm forces.  
Understanding this evolutionary cycle of business served as the starting point for gaining 
insight into the dynamic cycles of sourcing strategy in two-dimensional planes.  While 
much has been written about the left side of Fine’s model in terms of outsourcing, there 
is very little scholarly research addressing the monumental cycle shift which occurs from 
the disintegrated side to integrated side—the outsourcing-to-insourcing relocation shift.   
 
1.2  Motivation 
 The eventuality of this dynamic shift has also become an increasingly important 
subject of significant interest to the United States Air Force (USAF), the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and our Nation.  From the perspective of the USAF, there are currently 
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23 4th-, 5th-, and now 6th-generation weapon systems (e.g., C-17, F-22, F-35 respectively) 
which are predominantly sustained and supported through an outsourcing strategy 
referred to as the Contractor Supported Weapon Systems (CSWS) portfolio.  As seen in 
Figure 3 below, new weapon systems entering the inventory which have a predominant 
outsourced sustainment and support strategy in-place will put the USAF in a position 
where it may no longer be able to meet its mandated contribution to the overall DoD 
“50/50” mandate.  This mandate states that “not more than 50 percent of the funds made 
available in a fiscal year to a military department or a Defense Agency for depot-level 
maintenance and repair workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-
Federal Government personnel of such workload for the military department or the 
Defense Agency” (USC Title 10, Section 2466).  In other words, retiring the legacy 
weapon systems without insourcing the sustainment and support of key CSWS programs 
may leave the USAF in violation of U.S. Code.    
Figure 3 – USAF Sustainment Footprint (Source: Mr Reynolds, SAF/IEL) 
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The DoD is also “…required, by law, to maintain a core logistics capability that is 
government owned and government operated to meet contingency and other emergency 
requirements” (GAO, May 2009).  This is often referred to as the Department’s ‘core’ 
responsibilities which Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 specifies 
as an agencies responsibility to “…identify all activities performed by government 
personnel as either commercial or inherently governmental…” and to “…perform 
inherently governmental activities with government personnel” (OMB, 2003).  Narrowly 
defined, the GAO report and OMB A-76 require the DoD to identify, develop and retain 
“core” logistics capabilities.  However, as the CSWS portfolio programs have entered the 
USAF inventory, the USAF has relinquished development of its core capability to the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and/or their many subcontractors with 
measurable effects on the overall USAF and DoD inherently governmental core 
capabilities. 
The issue of insourcing is not unique to the DoD and USAF.  A 2010 report from 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS) titled, “Globalized Supply Chains and U.S. 
Policy,” identifies many public policy concerns associated with the globalization (i.e., 
outsourcing) of critical U.S. company supply chain functions and the associated impacts 
to taxation, trade and investment policy, labor and health care costs, infrastructure and 
transportation, education and training, and much more.  The CRS identifies the 
globalization of supply chains as a new paradigm, suggesting “…the traditional paradigm 
for policy was that the American economy consisted of U.S. businesses that operated 
primarily in the domestic market, hired U.S. workers, and sold to U.S. consumers but 
some production was either imported or exported.  International trade took place between 
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countries according to each nation’s competitive and comparative advantage” however, 
“…the world has now changed.  Like a child’s neural network, the global economy is 
constantly organizing and reorganizing itself with new linkages, supply networks, 
manufacturing chains, and marketing channels that arise in response to market forces and 
government policies” (CRS, 2010).  Furthermore, the CRS report suggests that a new 
policy paradigm must address these ever-evolving and increasingly complex international 
supply chains while recognizing that public policy has differing effects along the 
segmented production, sustainment and support chains.     
There has been a significant number of academic journal articles published 
addressing outsourcing but none addressing insourcing of sustainment and/or logistics 
support functions (Note: there are a very few which address insourcing of IT 
capabilities).  Table 1 below provides insight into some of the most significant 
outsourcing contributions categorized by research focus area—why firms outsource.   
Table 1 - Why Firms Outsource (Created from Mello et al., 2008) 
 
 
While outsourcing has been a primary topic of academic research and industry 
focus for over three decades, there is an impending “next evolution” which remains 
 Research Focus Author(s)
Cost reduction and service improvement
Boyson et al. , 1999; Lieb and Bentz, 2005; 
Maltz, 1994; Maltz and Ellram, 1997; Rao and 
Young, 1994; Sink and Langley, 1997
Focus on core competencies
Leahy, Murphy, and Poist, 1995; Razzaque and 
Sheng, 1998; Roa and Young, 1994; van Damme 
and van Amstel, 1996
Improve productivity Leahy, Murphy, and Poist, 1995
Upgrade information technology
Leahy, Murphy, and Poist, 1995; Sink and 
Langley, 1997
Leverage supply chain management Lieb and Randall, 1996; Rao and Young, 1994
Regulatory change Sink and Langley, 1997
Need for expertise
Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; Sink and Langley, 
1997; van Damme and van Amstel, 1996
Globalization of business Razzaque and Sheng, 1998
Just-in-time complexities Razzaque and Sheng, 1998
Rapid growth van Damme and van Amstel, 1996
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mostly undefined.  This dissertation research on the outsourcing-to-insourcing relocation 
shift begins to fill this gap in the logistics and supply chain literature and provides 
academics, as well as practitioners, approaches for addressing this monumental change in 
sourcing strategy.  The findings of this research suggest that the post-outsourcing 
paradigm will be followed by a strategic change in focus away from outsourcing as a 
corporate strategy.  This dynamic shift will most likely alter firm-level strategic business 
objectives, purchasing strategies, and inter-firm relationships.  This research identifies 
many of the multi-dimensional influential factors which have facilitated this dynamic 
shift and provides a new context for the advancement of strategic sourcing and 
purchasing theory. 
 
1.3  Research Contributions 
 This research makes three specific contributions to the logistics and supply chain 
management body of knowledge: 
• Identification and analysis of the linkage between buyer-supplier risk 
position, contract duration and supplier-side innovative investment needed 
to improve supply chain performance 
 
• Identification of the financial, manufacturing and supply chain complexity 
factor information elements required by decision makers prior to 
evaluating manufacturing relocation opportunities 
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• Identification and classification of the drivers or antecedents which 
manufacturers have identified as primary factors leading to an 
outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision 
 
 
1.4  Organization of Dissertation 
 The remainder of this research encompasses six chapters.  The second chapter 
addresses the overarching methodology applied throughout the course of the research.  
Chapter three is the academic paper submitted to the Journal of Business Logistics titled, 
“Contract Duration: A Barrier or Bridge to Supplier-side Investment in Public/Private 
Partnerships.”  Chapter four is the academic paper prepared for submission to the MIT 
Sloan Management Review titled, “Buyer Beware—Nearshoring, Reshoring and 
Insourcing, Moving Beyond the Total Cost of Ownership Discussion.” Chapter five is the 
final draft of an academic paper to be submitted to the Journal of Operations 
Management titled, “An Empirical Investigation of the Manufacturing Outsourcing-to-
Insourcing Antecedents.”  Chapter six provides a summary of the research, including 
managerial implications and a high-level decision support framework for decision makers 
considering opportunities to relocate manufacturing workload.  The framework ties 
together the major findings from Chapter 3 through Chapter 5. 
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2.0  Research Methodology 
 
2.1  Methodological Approach 
 This chapter addresses the overarching research methodology applied throughout 
the research process.  Chapters 3-6 each applies this overarching research methodology 
and, where appropriate, modifies the overarching research methodology as necessary to 
achieve the end-state research objective(s) for the specific academic paper.    
 
2.2 Qualitative Research 
 This research fills an apparent void in the academic literature addressing the 
influential factors (why?) which facilitated a manufacturer’s decision to make a 
manufacturing relocation decision and the process applied (how?) to effect the 
implementation of the relocation decision.  Qualitative research methods were selected to 
support this research since the primary focus was to address ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions 
concerning the outsourcing-to-insourcing relocation shift. 
Hayes (2000) identified the need for “less hypothesis testing and more systematic 
observation to help managers deal with their actual problems.”  As the research centered 
on ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions concerning the outsourcing-to-insourcing relocation shift, 
Yin (2009) and Ellram (1996) suggests that qualitative, explanatory case study research is 
appropriate.  This is in part due to the uniqueness of the contemporary event where there 
is little prior understanding of the phenomenon.  Coughlin and Coghlan (2002) 
recommend use of qualitative research methods to develop models and theories to explain 
current phenomena (i.e., the outsourcing-to-insourcing shift).   
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2.3  Sample Size 
Pratt (2009) states, “unlike quantitative research … there is no magic number of 
interviews or observations that should be conducted in a qualitative research project. 
What is ‘enough’ depends on the question a researcher seeks to answer.”  Witt and 
Redding (2009) suggests qualitative research methods usually make a trade-off between 
sample size and depth of research detail.  Eisenhardt (1989) suggests there is no ideal 
number of cases but 4-10 cases have worked well for most qualitative studies.  Her 
rationale is that researchers using less than 4 cases will find it difficult to convince 
readers of sufficient empirical grounding while those dealing with more than 10 cases 
may find it difficult to “cope with the complexity and volume of data,” gathered.   Ellram 
(1996) identifies the use of 6-10 cases for qualitative research as a sample size 
sufficiently large enough to properly evaluate a set of research propositions.   This body 
of research was developed using 51 structured interviews completed with 24 different 
companies and/or agencies, and incorporates findings from 14 specific case studies used 
to examine various elements of the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation 
shift. 
2.4  Sampling Strategy 
Eisenhardt (1989) states, “selection of cases is an important aspect of building 
theory from case studies…the concept of population is crucial, because the population 
defines the set of entities from which the research sample is to be drawn.  Also, selection 
of an appropriate population controls extraneous variation and helps to define the limits 
for generalizing the findings.”  She further adds, “while cases may be chosen randomly, 
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random selection is neither necessary, nor preferable.”  From these insights, this research 
applied the following sampling strategy with unit of analysis being the individual firm: 
• Research participants and cases were selected within the manufacturing 
and manufacturing material support industries for analysis as a means of 
controlling for variation across industries 
 
2.5  Theoretical Method 
Auerbach and Silverstein (2003) suggest Grounded Theory Methods (GTM) be 
used when:  
• research and theory are at their early, formative stage and not enough is 
known on the phenomenon to state hypothesis prior to the investigation; and 
• the major research interest lies in the identification and categorization of 
elements and the exploration of their connections. 
GTM affords the researcher the opportunity to “ground” the information or data 
discovered through the research process (e.g., interviews, review of archival records, 
surveys, etc.) through a holistic gathering and comparison of information or data to better 
understand complex phenomena (Glaser, 1978).  This is best done through an “iterative, 
process-oriented, analytic procedure using the two key operations: constant comparison 
and theoretical sampling” (Binder and Edwards, 2010). 
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2.6  Data Collection and Analysis 
In addition to issue-specific literature reviews, primary research information was 
gathered using a pre-interview questionnaire and the long interview method developed by 
McCracken (1988).  Ogden (2003) states, “the unit of analysis has a direct impact on the 
type of information the researcher will gather and from whom they will gather it.”  Since 
the selected unit of analysis was the firm, the preference was to conduct in-person, face-
to-face interviews.  There were, however, specific times in which the interviewee was 
only available by telephone.  Participants were selected who had familiarity with the 
relocation decision approach, implementation processes and/or outcomes.  This interview 
approach allowed for feedback and readdress of conversational points, providing 
clarification where needed and additional detail which may not have been possible 
through other interview / survey means.  Where allowed, interviews were recorded as a 
means of increasing precision and validity of the findings (Patton, 1990).  
Using GTM provided a structured approach where by an iterative, multi-phase 
collect-analyze-compare process was applied.  Binder and Edwards (2010) state that in 
using this approach, “the researcher moves back and forth between data collection, 
coding and interpretation in an iterative manner (analytic induction) until theoretical 
saturation is achieved (newly analyzed data do not prompt further changes to the 
concepts) which leads to a tightly woven theory that emerges from and is ‘grounded’ in 
the data.”  This approach, coupled with the use of “why” and “how” questions 
“…provide(d) depth and richness for constructing knowledge and building theories of 
contemporary and little known phenomena” (Binder and Edwards, 2010).   
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Strauss and Corbin (1998) provide a data and information coding methodology 
which allowed the researcher to systematically connect the information gathered through 
the interview process to the research objectives (i.e., research propositions, hypothesis 
and questions).  The coding methodology applied to this research was: 
 Stage 1: Development of key template categories based on research objectives. 
 Stage 2: Codification and analysis of interviews. 
 Stage 3: Clustering of codes into coherent categories. 
 Stage 4. Development of coding master table (axial and selective coding). 
 Stage 5. Formation of theoretical narratives and tentative propositions.   
 
Binder and Edwards (2010) suggest that this is not to be a linear approach from 
Stage 1 to 5, therefore the research approach involved iterations within and between 
stages as the researcher became more familiar with the data.  Figure 4 below illustrates 
the high-level approach applied during the data collection and analysis process.  It 
highlights the major steps of the approach which were required in order to achieve a high 
degree of research reliability (i.e., repeatability) (Yin, 1989).  This reliability will enable 
expansion of the number of cases and inclusion of other industries in the future efforts.  
 
Figure 4 – Research Data Collection and Analysis Approach 
Develop 
Theoretical 
Propositions
Conduct 
Pre-interview 
Survey
Select Cases
Conduct  
Case Study 
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Case Study 
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Write 
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Information and data gathered through the interview and case study approach was 
synthesized in cross-case reports then used as substantive and supporting content, along 
with other literature and research content, to produce original research publications in 
support of the overall dissertation requirements. 
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3.0  Academic Paper #1 – Contract Duration: A Barrier or Bridge to 
Supplier-side Investment In Public/Private Partnerships 
 
3.1  Abstract 
 
Public/private partnerships are predominantly executed through the use of formal 
contracts which define the relationship between the buying agency and a supplier.  The 
contract captures the responsibilities of each party in achieving a specific set of 
performance objectives.  Given current-year and expected future-year budget cuts across 
federally funded public agencies, there is an increasing need for suppliers to make 
investments which could reduce future-year costs of meeting contract performance 
objectives.  This research addresses two overarching questions specific to the issue of 
supplier-side investment.  First, “how does buyer and supplier perception of risk 
influence contract duration?” and second, “how does contract duration influence supplier-
side investment?”  To answer these questions, structured interviews were conducted with 
buying agencies and suppliers actively engaged in public/private partnerships.  Factors 
suspected to contribute to buyer and supplier risk position are evaluated.  Additionally, 
the linkage between buyer-supplier risk position, contract duration and supplier-side 
investment is addressed.  Outcomes suggest properly structured long-term contracts may 
1) provide the risk mitigation mechanisms needed for both buying agencies and suppliers, 
and 2) facilitate supplier-side investment.  Key Words:  public/private partnerships, 
supply chain contracts, buyer-supplier risk position, contract duration, supplier-side 
investment, supply chain performance 
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3.2  Introduction 
 
In light of the current global market and economic conditions, firms around the 
globe are working diligently to identify and assess risks to their short- and long-range 
objectives. In the United States, the significance of the global economic downturn is 
penetrating the business functions of even the strongest privately held firms and publicly 
traded companies.  Tax-payer funded public agencies such as the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) are also facing budget cuts which continue to force substantive changes 
to existing business policies and practices (Watts and Harrison, 2011).  Global economic 
conditions, as well as current-year and expected future-year federal budget cuts, highlight 
the need to examine buyer-supplier contractual relationships within the context of 
public/private partnerships.   
Many prominent researchers have completed exhaustive works examining buyer-
supplier relationships from numerous vantage points.  For example, much has been 
written addressing the type, development and utility of supply chain relationships, 
partnerships and alliances.  Table 2 below highlights several of these notable 
contributions to the body of knowledge. 
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Table 2 - Noteworthy Articles Addressing Supply Chain Relationships,  
Partnerships and Alliances 
 
 
 
As called out above, much has been published addressing the multiple dimensions 
of buyer-supplier relationships.  However, there appears to be a void in the supply chain 
management literature with respect to public/private partnerships in general and, more 
specifically, the function of long-term, formal contracts in public/private partnerships.  
Insights gained from the existing literature were used to inform the current research and 
assist in providing a platform from which to examine the linkage between the buyer-
supplier risk position, contract duration and supplier-side investment in public/private 
partnerships.  
The historical foundations for the application and utility of long-term contracts 
may go back further than Coase’s 1937 seminal article, The Nature of the Firm, but there 
are few scholarly works which have been cited as often or as widely to help address the 
Author(s) Title
Dwyer, F. Robert, Paul H. Schurr and Sejo Oh (1987) “Developing Buyer –Seller Relationships”
Bowersox, Donald J. (1990) "The Strategic Benefits of Logistics Alliances"
Heide, Jan B. and George John (1990) "Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of Joint Action in Buyer - Seller Relationships"
Ellram, Lisa M. (1995) "Partnership Pitfalls and Success Factors"
Lambert, Douglas M., Margaret A. Emmelhainz, and                               
John T. Gardner (1996) "Developing and Implementing Supply Chain Partnerships"
Singh, Kulwant and Will Mitchell (1996) "Precarious Collaboration: Business Survival After Partners Shut Down or Form New Partnerships"
Monczka, Robert M., Kenneth J. Petersen, Robert B. 
Handfield, and Gary L. Ragatz (1998) 
"Success Factors in Strategic Supplier Alliances:  The Buying 
Company Perspective"
Groves, Gwyn and Vassilios Valsamakis (1998) "Supplier - Customer Relationships and Company Performance"
Spekman, Robert E., John W. Kamauff, Jr., and Niklas 
Myhr (1998)
"An empirical investigation into supply chain management: A 
perspective on partnerships"
Soonhong Min, Anthony S. Roath, Patricia J. Daugherty, 
Stefan E. Genchev, Haozhe Chen, Aaron D. Arndt, and 
R. Glenn Richey (2005)
"Supply chain collaboration: what's happening?"
Golicic, Susan L. and John T. Mentzer (2006)  “An Empirical Examination of Relationship Magnitude”
Hoffer, Adrian R., A. Michael Knemeyer, and Martin E. 
Dresner (2009)
“Antecedents and Dimensions of Customer Partnering 
Behavior in Logistics Outsourcing Relationships”
Li, Julie Juan, Laura Poppo, and Kevin Zheng Zhou 
(2010)
"Relational Mechanisms, Formal Contracts, and Local 
Knowledge Acquisition By International Subsidiaries"
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multiple facets of business enterprises.  Of importance to the present research is Coase’s 
specific mention of the use of long-term contracts in the business enterprise: 
 
It may be desired to make long-term contract for the supply of some 
article or service.  This may be due to the fact that if one contract is 
made for a longer period, instead of several shorter ones, then certain 
costs of making each contract will be avoided.  Or, owing to the risk 
attitude of the people concerned, they may prefer to make a long rather 
than short-term contract. (Coase, 1937, pp 391) 
 
 
3.2.1  The Long-term Contract 
With respect to a single long-term contract instead of several shorter ones, there is 
an expected reduction of costs attributable to contract formulation and administration.  
Consistent with Coase’s approach to buyer-side total cost reduction, Graham et al., 
(1994) conclude there is greater success in decreasing costs achieved for buyers than that 
observed for suppliers in long-term strategic purchasing partnerships.  Frascatore and 
Mahmoodi (2008) discovered that collaboratively developed long-term contracts in 
which the business relationship is repeated, increased the supply chain profit potential.   
Long-term contracts should also be expected to facilitate or maximize development of 
trust and communication in the buyer-supplier relationship (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 
1995). 
In addition to costs reductions and depth of relationship development, other 
researchers suggest buyer firms achieve additional benefits through long-term supplier 
development efforts (Krause and Ellram, 1997).  If, as has been well documented, there 
are significant value positions to be taken in long-term buyer-supplier contracts / 
exchanges, the overarching questions which must be answered are first, “how do buyer 
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and supplier perception of risk influence contract duration?” and second, “how does 
contract duration influence supplier-side investment?”  This research attempts to address 
these questions as part of the larger and increasingly more important focus on potential 
uses of long-term contracts to create sustainable public/private partnerships. 
 
 
3.2.2  Risk Attitude 
 
In addressing Coase’s risk attitude of people concerned statement cited above, it 
is relevant here to introduce his 1988 position that the main activity of a firm is that of 
running a business (Coase, 1988).  It is common knowledge that running a business 
inherently includes elements of risk.  However, it is important here to acknowledge that 
risks in the buyer-supplier relationship, perceived or real, do not singularly belong to 
either the buyer or the supplier.  It may be through this lens that a key function of long-
term contracts is seen, that of addressing risk in the buyer-supplier relationship which 
could adversely affect achievement of short- and long-term business objectives.  Thus 
there is a dynamic, rather than static, view of the value placed on long-term contracts or 
“legal bonds” dependent upon the relationship position and risk perception (Cannon and 
Perreault, 1999). 
In the literature we find insight into how firms may elect to structure contracts to 
manage risks in the business enterprise.  Williamson (1985 and 1993), from the buyer’s 
perspective, presents the supplier as an opportunistic, advantage seeking agent.  In this 
case, the buyer may develop detailed contracts to govern supplier opportunism in the 
relationship.  The buyer perceives the detailed contract to serve as a mechanism to 
mitigate uncertainty and increase security (Glaister and Buckely, 1997).  However, 
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Wuyts and Geyskens (2005), provide evidence that detailed contracts may encourage 
opportunistic behaviors, not prevent them. 
Another view of the supplier is that presented by Macneil (1978, 1980, 1981).  
Here the buyer may view the supplier as a cooperating partner in the buyer-supplier 
relationship.  This position is supported by Provan and Gassenheimer (1994) where they 
suggest that, “by cooperating and focusing on long-range outcomes, both buyer and 
supplier may well be able to compete more successfully than in traditional market or 
contract-based exchange since transaction costs related to opportunism will be low and 
pressures for short-run results will be few.” Using the Williamson and MacNeil views as 
a backdrop, we seek to understand the function of long-term contracts as a mechanism to 
promote supplier-side investments in areas which improve overall supply chain 
operations. 
 
3.3  Literature Review and Proposition Development 
 
As Handfield and Bechtel (2002) identified, there is a need for a better 
understanding of the role of contracts in managing buyer-supplier relationships.  It is our 
central proposition that long-term formal contracts do matter in the context of creating 
stability in the buyer-supplier exchange.  Given the documented value of long-term 
contracts/exchanges, and with consideration of risk attitudes, we propose it is this 
collective risk position which directly influences desired contract duration.  Furthermore, 
we propose it is long-term contracts that enable or facilitate supplier-side investments.  
We identify six propositions concerning the influence of perceived risk on contract 
duration and supplier-side investment.  Propositions P1a through P4b address factors 
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contributing to the buyer-supplier risk position, Proposition P5 addresses buyer-supplier 
contract duration and Proposition P6 addresses the influence of contract duration on 
supplier-side investment.   
We speculate that buyers and suppliers consciously evaluate perceptions of 
collective risk (P1a – P4b) and it is the collective risk which drives determination of an 
appropriate contract duration (P5) necessary to mitigate the perceived risk.  Additionally, 
it is posited that suppliers perceive investments as a risk in the absence of a long-term 
formal contract.  We posit that with a long-term contract in place, suppliers will make 
investments in processes and technologies necessary to improve supply chain operations 
(P6).  The significant research contributions expected are a) the collective assessment of 
the influential factors as a function of buyer and supplier risk position, b) the effect of 
risk position on contract duration, and c) the effect of contract duration on a supplier’s 
willingness to make investments.  The research propositions investigating these 
contributions are formalized below.     
 
3.3.1  Perception of Partnership Motive 
 
For the purposes of this research, we define Perception of Partnership Motive as 
the buyer’s (supplier’s) perception of supplier’s (buyer’s) underlying purpose or rationale 
for seeking to formalize a long-term contractual relationship.  Andrew Cox (2001) may 
put it best, “individuals and organizations primarily indulge in exchange relationships in 
order to satisfy their desire for money.”  With this lead in proposition, we are suggesting 
that the buyer’s perception of why the supplier seeks to engage in a contractual buyer-
supplier relationship, aside from the ‘desire for money’ is an important issue.  We posit 
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that how the buyer perceives the supplier’s motive for entering the relationship is a key 
contributing factor in the buyer’s risk position.  Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) contend 
that if the buyer-supplier goals in the relationship are divergent it could expose the buyer 
to opportunity costs of forgone exchanges with other suppliers.  Therefore, inaccurate 
assessment of the supplier motive could have considerable long-term implications. We 
posit these same concerns are shared on the supplier-side.  
While there has been extensive work done in the area of supplier relationship 
management (for example see Park et al., (2010)), to include areas such as supplier 
selection and supplier management, there is much less in the literature specifically 
addressing supplier-side motives for seeking contractual business relations with specific 
firms. However, one such piece of work relevant to this issue is that developed by Ellram 
(1995). In a study based on 80 paired responses of buyers and suppliers, Ellram notes that 
the number one reason why suppliers enter into partnerships is to “secure a reliable 
market for a given product.”  Additional reasons may include the price the supplier is 
able to receive and the ability to establish reliable or predictable demand. 
Hald, Cordon and Vollman (2009) provide another basis for understanding the 
expected value a supplier may seek to attain in engaging in long-term relationships with 
buyers.  Here we find two motives discussed, “price/volume” and “growth”.  
Price/volume suggests that suppliers will seek out buyers that are willing to pay higher 
prices for more value.  Growth recognizes that suppliers will seek out buyers who are 
expanding which may lead to increased sales and revenue for the supplier through higher 
volumes.  Additional reasons suppliers may seek to engage with buyers could include 
expansion of customer base, to improve efficiency of production capacity, to gain access 
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to buyer knowledge, to protect against market instability, or to establish long-term 
revenue streams.  Our intent here is to understand the importance buyers and sellers place 
on the perception of the partner’s motives and the contribution of motive to buyer-
supplier risk position.  We submit the following propositions for evaluation:    
 
Proposition 1a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s partnership motive is an 
important influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
 
Proposition 1b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s partnership motive is 
an important influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
 
 
3.3.2  Perception of Relationship Trust 
 
Hald, Cordon and Vollman (2009) provide insight into the dyadic buyer-supplier 
relationship, “the challenge for managers is to provide mechanisms that create 
perceptions of own firm as valuable, and trustworthy in the eyes of their dyad associate.”  
Here we define Perception of Relationship Trust as the buyer’s (supplier’s) perception of 
supplier’s (buyer’s) willingness to engage honestly and, where appropriate, openly in the 
formal long-term contractual relationship.  Our proposition pre-supposes that the buyer’s 
investigation of the supplier’s trustworthiness is deep enough to get beyond the 
‘perceptions’ purposefully created and portrayed by the supplier.  We propose the same 
should be true of the supplier’s investigative approach.  In other words, our research 
acknowledges but does not evaluate a buyer’s or seller’s ‘perception of perceptions’.  We 
are interested in understanding how buyers and sellers perceive that each will perform 
whatever serves the trustor’s best interest (Das and Teng, 1998).  As in our definition of 
relationship trust above, we are seeking to evaluate how perception of the ability and 
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willingness to engage honestly and openly is linked to a risk position and, in-turn to 
formal contract duration.  
An aligned investigative position relevant to understanding how relational trust 
influences buyer-supplier risk position and, in-turn, contract duration, is to determine 
whether or not the perception of relational trust is time dependent, i.e., transaction-
specific or strategic in nature.  There is an important distinction.  Jones et al., (2010) 
highlight that higher levels of trust are required in collaborative relationships than those 
observed in transactional or arms-length relationships.  Therefore, we should anticipate 
perceptions of relational trust associated with short-term, transaction-specific events to 
contribute less in shaping the buyer-supplier risk position than if the intent is to engage in 
a long-term, strategic relationship. 
Trust may be, as Spekman (1988) suggests, the cornerstone of strategic 
partnerships but if the buyer’s focus entering into the buyer-supplier relationship is not 
strategic, this creates a different evaluative lens from which to view the supplier.  We 
propose, as Zaheer et al., (1998) determined, firms engaging in exchange relationships 
that have high trust to derive a competitive advantage.  In the Jones et al., (2010) 
capability / commitment matrix, we see that buyer’s perception of relational trust is an 
important influential factor to be considered in light of the complexities of developing 
trust at the level “requisite for collaborative relationships that bring competitive 
advantage.”  Again, if there is no intent from the buyer to extend the relationship beyond 
one or more short-term transactions, or from the supplier to seek development of 
competitive advantage, then we may discover that trust does not significantly contribute 
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to the buyer-supplier risk position.  To evaluate this, we provide the following 
propositions: 
Proposition 2a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s relationship trust is an 
 important influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
 
Proposition 2b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s relationship trust is an 
important influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
 
 
3.3.3  Performance Objectives 
 
A buyer or supplier’s capability to meet performance objectives could be 
classified by skills, knowledge, experience or other resources utilized to meet buyer-
specified performance objectives.  Consistent with this view we define Performance 
Objectives as the buyer’s (supplier’s) confidence in the supplier’s (buyer’s) capability to 
achieve contracted product or service performance objectives.  Johnston et al., (2004) 
identify the importance of ensuring supplier performance dimensions align with buyer’s 
objectives.  The authors suggest that each buyer-supplier relationship is different and, as 
such, each relationship may require a unique set of performance measures.  Prahinski and 
Benton (2004) consider supplier performance as operational measures such as product 
quality, delivery performance, price, service support and ability to respond to change.  
Shin, Collier and Willson (2000) provide supplier performance measures as supplier cost, 
delivery reliability, lead time, on-time delivery and quality.  Buyer’s and supplier’s 
confidence may be influenced by the criteria or approaches used to evaluate the potential 
contract opportunity.  Groves and Valsamakis (1998) identify supplier selection criteria 
as price, past performance, quality assurance, internal quality, technological capability, 
human resources, financial stability, design and R&D capability.   
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Buyers and suppliers must evaluate expected contract performance objectives in 
an effort to determine whether or not the performance objectives are realistic, achievable, 
or contain undefined levels of uncertainty which may expose the supplier to additional 
risk.  Buyers and suppliers must also establish evaluative criteria from which to gauge 
levels of risk presented as performance objectives.  Here we seek to understand how 
buyers and suppliers assign measures of risk to contract performance objectives.  
Propositions 3a and 3b below have been developed to facilitate this understanding.  
While the supply chain literature is rich with supplier selection and supplier performance 
approaches, there appears to be an absence of literature addressing approaches suppliers 
use to evaluate potential buyers.  The evaluation of Proposition 3b may provide some 
initial insights and help to establish a framework for future research in this area.   
 
Proposition 3a. Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s capability to achieve 
contracted product or service performance objectives is an important 
influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
 
Proposition 3b. Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s capability to achieve 
contracted product or service performance objectives is an important 
influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
 
 
3.3.4  Financial Objectives 
 
Central to the discussion of buyer-supplier inter-firm dynamics is the 
understanding of the methods of achieving general and specific financial objectives.  
These objectives could be profit seeking, containment of financially-derived risk, 
quantifying expected returns on investment or even cost control.  Kang, Mahoney and 
Tan (2009) capture rationale for why suppliers may make strategic buyer-specific 
investments without revenue guarantee if there is perceived opportunity to develop and 
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extend value with the same buyer or with a third party.  However, we do not seek to 
identify and codify specific financial objectives in this research.  Our interest is to 
understand how the buyer’s and supplier’s perception of their own responsibilities to the 
intra-firm financial objectives influence the collective buyer-supplier risk position.  In 
support of this we define Financial Objectives as the buyer’s (supplier’s) confidence in 
the supplier’s (buyer’s) willingness to support achievement of intra-firm fiscal objectives 
resulting from the formation of the contractual relationship.  We posit that incongruence 
of understanding between buyer and supplier views on how the inter-firm relationship 
can support achievement of intra-firm financial objectives will lead to significantly 
different degrees of perceived risk.  Propositions 4a and 4b serve to support examination 
and evaluation of this.  
 
Proposition 4a. Buyer’s responsibility for achieving intra-firm financial 
objectives is an important influential factor in determining the buyer-side 
risk position.  
 
Proposition 4b. Supplier’s responsibility for achieving intra-firm financial 
objectives is an important influential factor in determining the supplier-side 
risk position. 
 
 
3.3.5  Buyer-Supplier Risk Position and Contract Duration 
 
We introduce the following diagram (Figure 5) to illustrate the preceding 
influences addressed in Propositions 1a - 4b.  The Buyer-Supplier Risk Position begins to 
speak to the collective pool of risks resulting from the perception of partnership motive 
and relationship trust as well as views on performance and financial objectives.  We posit 
risk pooling and impact analysis occurs for both buyers and sellers in the overall 
evaluation of the potential business relationship.  Hallikas et al., (2004) validate the 
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extent of this, “every company is responsible for its own risks, it must identify the risks 
from its own viewpoint.”  Our focus here is the outcome of the risks analysis and the 
effect collective risk has on the buyer or seller’s preferred contract duration.  Again we 
are suggesting that the ability to mitigate collective risk in the contractual relation is a 
critical element in determining desired contract duration.  Proposition 5 captures this 
focus. 
 
Proposition 5. Buyer – supplier collective risk position directly influences 
desired contract duration. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Risk Position and Contract Duration 
 
 
 
3.3.6  Contract Duration and Supplier-side Investment 
 
Williamson’s (1996) position on transaction cost theory emphasizes the 
importance of analyzing individual transactions to ensure alignment with strategic 
objectives and to minimize risks.  Proposition 6 seeks to understand how contract 
duration acts to enable supplier investment in processes or technologies which could, if 
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made, improve overall supply chain performance. We posit long-term, complete contracts 
serve as the risk protection mechanism which provides suppliers the basis for evaluating 
strategic investment strategies.  Banerjee, Dasgupt and Kim (2008) discuss ‘complete’ 
contracts as those that minimize ex post bargaining and opportunism after specific 
investments have been made.  Here we are addressing asset specificity investment--those 
investments which the supplier would not otherwise make were it not for the specific 
contractual relationship.  Hines (1994) categorizes these types of investments as physical, 
site, human and dedicated assets.  Trent and Monczka (1998), in their survey addressing 
future purchasing and supply management trends, expected “at least half of all contracts 
to be long-term” within the next several years.  They suggested that this would be in 
response to a continuing need to reduce transaction costs in the buyer-supplier 
relationship.  We extend this position and posit that contracts in public/private 
partnerships will increase in duration in response to the need for public agencies to not 
only reduce costs but significantly improve overall supply chain performance through 
supplier-side investment. 
For the purposes of this research, we define long-term contracts as those which 
exceed three years.  This position is developed from Graham et al., (1994) where they 
found that after three years of involvement in partnership-type relationships there was a 
“trend toward increased or accelerated success in strategy implementation.”  Proposition 
6 addresses the role long-term contracts may serve in enabling suppliers to make strategic 
investments.  Ojala and Hallikas (2006) state the type of buyer-seller relationship affects 
the perceived risk related to a supplier’s willingness to make investment.  Williamson 
(1985) suggests relationship-specific investments are a necessary function leading to 
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value creation within the overall buyer-seller system.  We propose that it is the long-term 
contract in public/private partnerships which enables suppliers to make this investment.  
Figure 6 below graphically illustrates the relationship and linkage of research 
propositions as presented above.  The research approach and outcomes are discussed in 
the sections that follow. 
 
Proposition 6.  A long-term buyer – supplier contract enables supplier-side 
strategic  investment. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Relationships and Linkages of Research Propositions 
 
 
3.4  Research Approach 
 
As the primary questions revolve around ‘how’ and ‘why’, and the focus was on 
“a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context,” (Yin, 1989), a qualitative 
multiple-case study research strategy was deemed appropriate for this research (Ellram, 
1996).  In order to gain a broad understanding of the propositions, the researchers 
conducted structured interviews with senior executives, program managers, buyers and 
purchasing officials from fifteen buying agencies and suppliers actively engaged in 
public/private partnerships.  The organizations interviewed are listed in Table 3 below.   
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The organizations were selected following the Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) 
approach, “because they are particularly suitable for illuminating and extending 
relationships and logic among constructs.”  Although a single case study would be 
sufficient for describing the phenomenon under study (Siggelkow, 2007), Yin (1994) 
suggests multiple-case studies provide a stronger position for theory building.  It is with 
this in mind that we suggest this research and subsequent results are best classified as an 
exploratory study from which to build future public/private partnership research upon.   
 
 
Table 3 - Buying Agencies and Suppliers 
 
 
 
Due to the sensitivity of public/private contractual relations and the competitive 
nature of government contracting the following assurances were provided to each 
participant.  First, in order to protect the anonymity of the participating agencies and 
organizations, we randomly assigned alpha designations as reflected in Table 4.  There is 
no implied nor inferred ordering or connection between Tables 3 and 4.  Second, 
quotations are assigned to a position rather than a specific agency, organization or 
individual, i.e., “as a senior supply chain manager said.”  This approach may provide the 
necessary protective measures requested by the participants yet allows both scholars and 
practitioners to gain insights and applications from the findings.  
Pratt & Whitney
WESCO
Grainger
Royal Australian Air ForceGEXPRO
Boeing--F/A-18 Program Store Room Solutions
E&R Industrial
Kimberly Clark Professionals
United States Air Force, Aeronautical 
Systems Center Contracting Officials
Boeing--C-17 Program Stanley Proto
Chrysler
Lockheed Martin--F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter Program
United States Air Force, Oklahoma City 
Air Logistics Center, Acquisition Center 
of Excellence
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The research approach used standardized, mostly open-ended interviews with the 
structured questions providing a framework for the interview.  Data was collected using 
the long interview method developed by McCracken (1988), as well as application of 
interview techniques outlined by Yin (1989) and Patton (2002).  In addition, the 
researchers made provisions to digitally record and then transcribe each interview to help 
ensure content accuracy.  The researchers utilized a selective coding method to identify 
specific drivers and sub-dimensions (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
  
3.5  Findings 
Each proposition is addressed in a summary manner in the sections below based 
on an inclusive review and cross-case comparison of the interviews.  Our starting point 
was an evaluation of the influential factor rankings.  Based on the categorical definitions 
provided, each interviewee was asked to rank or prioritize the influential factors 
contributing to buyer-supplier risk position where a ranking of 1 is considered most 
influential and a ranking of 4 is considered least influential.  Table 4 summarizes the 
collection of responses.   
 
Table 4 - Summary of Influential Factors 
 
 
 
Most 
Influential
Least 
Influential
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
Financial 
Obligations 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 4 23
Performance 
Objectives 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 4 2 2 1 3 30
Relationship 
Trust 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 4 3 2 44
Partnership 
Motive 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 1 53
OrganizationInfluential 
Factor Total
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Here we see from a summary perspective the ranking of influential factors from 
most influential (Financial Obligations) to least influential (Partnership Motive).  While 
this summary is informative, perhaps more important is the specific rationale or 
support/defense of the rankings discovered during the interview process.  Several of these 
specific references are incorporated within the proposition summaries below where they 
provide context and structure to the numerical values.  Additionally, broader 
generalizations have also been included based on the collection of information obtained 
throughout the interview process.  
Propositions 1a-4b have been evaluated using information summarized in Table 4 
above as well as information pulled through the cross-case comparison of interview 
responses.  Propositions 5 and 6 were evaluated using cross-case comparison of the 
interviewee responses gathered through the structured interview process.  For the 
purposes of this research the following definitions have been applied in evaluating each 
proposition against the information gathered: 
• Supported: Consistency of support in responses 
 
• Partially Supported: Inconsistency of support in responses; exceptions  
                                  noted 
 
• Not Supported: Responses consistently did not support the proposition;  
                         Exceptions noted 
 
 
 
3.5.1  Evaluation of Propositions 1a-1b:  Perception of Partnership Motive 
 
Proposition 1a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s partnership motive is an 
important influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
 
Proposition 1b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s partnership motive is 
an important influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
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Findings:  Not Supported.  Propositions 1a and 1b allowed for a combined 
summary due to the parallel of responses from buyers and suppliers.  With respect to the 
definition Perception of Partnership Motive we found buyers and suppliers did not 
consider the ‘motive’ of the potential relationship participant as a significant influential 
factor contributing to an overall risk position and impact contract duration in 
public/private partnerships.  Ten of fifteen interviews ranked Partnership Motive as the 
least influential factor contributing to buyer-supplier risk position and desired contract 
duration.  Acknowledging the single interviewee who assigned a ranking of 1 (most 
important) to this factor, their focus was on the need to ensure buyer-supplier motives 
were aligned early on in discussions of a potential contractual partnership.  
Although buyers and suppliers did not consider partnership motive significantly 
influential, several interviewees, both buyers and suppliers, did acknowledge the 
importance of ensuring buyer-supplier motive alignment.  From the buyer-side 
perspective, supplier motive in public/private partnerships is rarely considered as a 
significant influence as there is an assumption the supplier has a profit seeking motive.  A 
senior public agency contracting official suggests, “it is the buyer’s responsibility to 
ensure this motive is addressed through competitive market research.”  Where buyers 
may seek to mitigate influence of the supplier through market research, both buyers and 
sellers acknowledge the need to achieve some measurable degree of motive alignment.  
This position may be best reflected in a statement provided by a supplier-side senior 
manager, “if the motives are aligned then it is easy to get to the right performance and 
price outcomes” in the contract and the correct contract type and duration that will 
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support these outcomes.  With these findings we could not conclude that buyer or 
supplier motive was an important influential factor effecting the buyer-supplier risk 
position.   
Based on Table 4 and the information gathered during the structured interview 
process, we did not find sufficient support for Propositions 1a and 1b and therefore 
conclude that each is not supported.  Buyer and supplier motives are relevant to the 
discussion in as much as motives may drive behavior.  However, in public/private 
partnerships, partnership motives do not appear to be considered as a factor significantly 
contributing to the overall buyer-supplier risk position.  
   
 
3.5.2  Evaluation of Propositions 2a-2b:  Perception of Relationship Trust 
 
Proposition 2a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s relationship trust is an 
important influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
 
 
Findings:  Partially Supported.  Buyer’s perception of supplier’s relationship trust 
in public/private partnerships was identified as one of many elements considered during 
initial market research (i.e., pre-contract supplier evaluations) and prior to any decision to 
formally engage in a contractual relationship with any new supplier(s).  Our findings 
suggest that the process of market research may serve as a substitution for trust in pre-
contract public/private partnerships.  Although trust does not appear to be a significant 
influential factor (in Table 4) contributing to the initial risk position of the buyer, 
instances were noted where supplier trust may be considered post-contract award.  In 
discussing the effect of trust, several buyers stated that the degree to which the supplier 
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was willing to engage honestly in addressing critical supply chain issues during the initial 
contract period of performance is an area given significant consideration during 
discussions of contract renewal.  In other words, the buyer’s perception of relationship 
trust is developed post contract award and is linked to supplier performance.  For 
example, in one specific case cited during the interview process, a supplier had worked 
with the buyer to resolve and improve supply chain performance issues which resulted in 
a no-compete multi-year follow-on contract.  As seen here, trust may not have been a 
significant factor pre-contract award but was influential in determining contract 
continuation and/or renewal.  Based on these findings we conclude Proposition 2a is 
partially supported.     
 
 
Proposition 2b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s relationship trust is an 
important influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
 
 
Findings:  Partially Supported.  Here it is important to note there are key 
differences in how suppliers address the importance of relationship trust depending on the 
type of contractual relationship they have entered.  First, in transactional buyer-supplier 
relationships, perception of buyer’s trust may be limited in scope to areas such as “ability 
of the buyer to make timely payment for materials shipped” or “not disclosing our 
confidential pricing to our competitors” as called out by two senior supplier-side 
representatives.  In this case, the supplier is concerned with the buyer’s ability to meet 
minimum business objectives.  Second, for those suppliers engaged in performance-based 
contracts, one senior manager stated, “relationships and trust are fundamental to even 
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getting to the table” to begin contract negotiations.  Here the supplier’s perspective is that 
of ensuring the buyer is focused on developing contract performance objectives that are 
achievable and realistically measured.  In both cases the supplier is looking at 
relationship trust as an informal mechanism needed when addressing issues not 
specifically called out in the formal contract which inherently arises during contract 
execution.  Trusting the buyer will enter into the contractual relationship with this 
mindset is very important to the success of the supplier in both transactional and 
performance-based contract relationships.  
An interesting area that emerged during the interviews involved discussions 
addressing the supplier’s ability to trust the buyer with responsible management of the 
supplier’s brand.  Senior executives representing one supplier-side company stated, “a 
supplier’s perception of the buyer’s relationship trust must include discussion of 
protecting our brand image as a contributor to risk position.”  The context of this 
statement included discussion of protection of proprietary processes, technologies and 
data/information which if disclosed could negatively impact the supplier’s competitive 
position in the market.  In response to these discussions, we brought this point up during 
follow-up discussions with a group of public agency buyers.  One buyer-side manager 
suggested that the buyer’s trust in the company’s brand and working with the supplier to 
protect that brand image is very important and that in public/private partnerships public 
agencies work to protect supplier interests. 
Table 4 indicates that Perception of Relationship Trust is ranked third out of four 
factors evaluated.  However, based on information gathered during the structured 
interview process we conclude that Propositions 2a and 2b are partially supported.  There 
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are some inconsistencies noted but we did find that both buyers and suppliers identify 
relationship trust as a factor contributing to buyer-supplier risk position in public/private 
partnerships.   
3.5.3  Evaluation of Propositions 3a-3b:  Performance Objectives 
 
Proposition 3a. Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s capability to achieve 
contracted product or service performance objectives is an important 
influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
 
 
Findings:  Supported.  Here we are gauging the importance placed by the buyer 
on the supplier’s capabilities.  Although the ranking of influential factors suggest 
Financial Objectives is the most important factor, throughout the interviews both buyers 
and sellers shared more detail concerning the importance of Performance Objectives in 
shaping the risk position.  
Buyers evaluate the supplier’s products, as well as services, with respect to their 
capability to achieve contract-specific objectives.  Many buyers expressed their belief 
that the proper sequence should be to accurately identify requirements then evaluate 
potential capabilities of potential suppliers.  Here buyers assign risk based on the 
perception of the supplier’s capabilities based on demonstrated past performance or other 
less formal means such as reputation in the market.  In transactional relationships, risk is 
carried forward from one transaction to the next.  In long-term partnerships, however, 
buyers acknowledge there are times when the outcome is better achieved when suppliers 
are involved early on in the requirements development process.  In these cases, a core 
step in the process is to seek supplier input, collaboratively focusing on requirements 
development.  For example, buyers understand suppliers may be best positioned to 
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address very complex supply chain or material solutions, therefore a jointly developed 
requirements baseline can best be achieved between buyer and seller subject matter 
experts.  This second process appears to significantly decrease the buyer risk position and 
is consistent with the position advocated by Johnston et al., (2004), ensuring supplier 
performance measures align with buyer’s objectives.  Our research does find an 
abundance of content, including factor rankings, to firmly conclude Proposition 3a is 
fully supported.  The buyer’s belief the supplier has the capability to achieve contracted 
objectives very much influences the overall buyer-side risk position.    
 
 
Proposition 3b. Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s capability to achieve 
contracted product or service performance objectives is an important 
influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
 
 
Findings:  Supported.  There is no single area in the interview process which 
received as much attention from suppliers as Performance Objectives.  There are two 
interrelated key components of these discussions, buyer’s role in accurately defining 
requirements and the development of supporting metrics or performance measures.  One 
supplier-side executive said, “requirements can be aggressive but must be aligned with 
the correct performance measures” if the supplier is to be able to allocate the resources 
necessary to be successful.  Another said the key question is, “how long will it take to 
implement” the supply chain strategy in order to begin satisfying the performance 
requirements.  In both cases, the foundational element which has the ability to reduce the 
contribution of this factor in supplier risk position is the accuracy of performance 
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objectives.  The consistent discussion across interviews concerning these key areas 
allows us to consider this proposition supported, without exception. 
Some suppliers have even suggested the creation and use of a “publishable 
performance” record which would provide potential competitors insights into the 
supplier’s performance.  The senior managers suggesting the use of a published 
performance record, excluding any proprietary information, supports development of 
open communications between buyers and potential sellers.  This approach would allow 
potential competitors an insight into how the current contract holder is performing against 
the measures of performance and allows competitors to make decisions concerning future 
pursuit of a potential buyer’s business.  The premise of their position is that if 
competitors see the supplier is performing well they may not be inclined to pursue the 
contract should it come up for competition.  Additionally, if the current supplier is not 
performing well, other suppliers can inquire about why the current supplier is not able to 
achieve the buyer’s targeted performance levels.  The inability to meet the performance 
objectives could be a sign that the buyer has unnecessarily high performance levels that 
cannot be achieved.  The suppliers who support this type of shared disclosure suggest this 
is a form of shared risk mitigation strategy in the market.  In all cases, a supplier’s belief 
that the buyer has the ability to achieve stated performance objectives is considered a 
significant contributor to the supplier’s risk position. 
Based on our findings, we conclude Propositions 3a and 3b are supported.  The 
interviews and factor rankings indicate clearly defined requirements and performance 
measures are important areas of the buyer-seller risk position. 
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3.5.4  Evaluation of Propositions 4a-4b:  Financial Objectives 
 
Proposition 4a. Buyer’s responsibility for achieving intra-firm financial 
objectives is an important influential factor in determining the buyer-side 
risk position.  
 
Proposition 4b. Supplier’s responsibility for achieving intra-firm financial 
objectives is an important influential factor in determining the supplier-side 
risk position. 
 
 
Findings:  Supported.  Propositions 4a and 4b are addressed in a single summary 
since our research findings suggest both buyers and sellers share very similar concerns 
with respect to ensuring the buyer-supplier relationship supports achievement of intra-
firm financial objectives.  For buyers, the key focus is ensuring the best product or best 
service is acquired which meets specific intra-firm financial objectives.  Working with 
suppliers to reduce cost, even post contract award, is a determining factor in the selection 
of long-term strategic partners.  For suppliers, the key focus is on protecting or preserving 
the ability to achieve intra-firm financial objectives as supported by the specific buyer-
supplier relationship.  If investment is required on behalf of the supplier firm, the key 
focus is on developing a contractual relationship with the buyer which affords every 
opportunity to meet financial targets while at the same time minimizing risk exposure. 
Our research suggests there are opportunities in most public/private contractual 
relationships to expand the understanding of shared financial objectives.  Buyers seeking 
to reduce cost must ensure the supplier has the ability to assist.  One senior supply-side 
manager believes, “buyers must be willing to engage in long-term strategic buys if they 
want suppliers to reduce per-unit costs.”  In other words, suppliers may have the ability to 
assist the buyer in minimizing risk to intra-firm financial objectives but there is a need for 
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a more open, collaborative relationship.  This can also be said in the case of the supplier.  
Suppliers must be willing to expose cost information (without fear of the buyer releasing 
the information to competitors) and demonstrate an understanding of cost reduction 
strategies which would assist the buyer. 
In both cases, for buyers and suppliers, the ability to achieve intra-firm financial 
objectives is considered to significantly contribute the buyer-supplier risk position.  
Based on Table 4 findings and the review of interviewee comments, we conclude 
Propositions 4a and 4b are supported.    
 
 
3.5.5  Evaluation of Proposition 5:  Buyer-Supplier Risk Position and  
          Contract Duration 
 
Proposition 5. Buyer-supplier perception of collective risk position directly 
influences desired contract duration. 
 
 
Findings:  Supported.  Both buyers and suppliers see long-term contracts as a 
critical foundation for addressing highly complex or uncertain supply chain 
characteristics.  However, both suggest that there are cases where short-term contracts 
may provide each party the opportunity to work through some of these uncertainties prior 
to engaging in a long-term contract.  
Perhaps the best way to discuss this proposition is to assess the proposition from 
the individual vantage points of buyers and suppliers.  From the buyer perspective our 
research reveals that in public/private partnerships involving low to medium risk, shorter 
term contracts are desired.  This allows the public agency to re-compete contracted work, 
and where possible, decrease product or service costs.  Another advantage of shorter term 
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contracts identified by buyers is the ability to re-compete these contracts more often over 
time and, in turn, grow the supplier base.  The expanded supply base was positioned as a 
way to increase supplier competition with an expectation that this would lead to a 
reduction in buyer-side costs. 
Where the public/private partnership includes contract objectives involving higher 
risks or uncertainties (i.e., new technology development) longer term contracts may be 
executed.  Buyers suggest this allows the supplier time to stabilize the process or 
technology and better achieve contracted performance objectives.  An interesting add to 
this discussion is the view of one senior public agency buyer who stated that contract 
“length doesn’t drive effectiveness; however, how the contract is structured does.”  In 
this case, structure refers to how the supplier is paid for labor and material costs.  The 
contract could be structured as a Firm Fixed Price, Time and Materials, Cost Plus or a 
hybrid including some form of incentive payment.  Buyers stated that there is a current 
emphasis being placed on shorter-term contracts structured as Firm Fixed Price, 
suggesting that this will reduce the public agencies’ overall risk position.  This approach 
suggests public agency buyers may prefer to apply a contract structure first before 
considering contract duration.   
Contract duration is of primary importance with suppliers.  Rather than putting 
contract structure first, suppliers engaged in public/private partnerships consistently 
stated that the preference is to have a contract of sufficient duration to mitigate risks, 
whether this risk is financial, performance or other firm-specific objective such as 
penetrating and sustaining market share.  As one supplier executive stated, “the economy 
has turned up the heat on taking cost out of business.  This may lead to shorter contracts 
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in the future.”  However, suppliers suggest that shorter duration contracts, regardless of 
structure, force the supplier to recover contract-related investment costs on the front end 
of the contract which, if spread out across a longer duration could reduce buyer-side 
costs.  Other suppliers suggest that in those cases where the supplier has significant 
upfront investment in support of developing complex technologies, the assumption of 
considerable risk is best mitigated through longer term contracts.  The same position 
applies to cases where the achievement of contract-specific objectives involves 
substantial inventory investment or a requirement to provide highly specialized staffing.  
Our findings suggest that suppliers perceive that longer term contracts reduce supplier-
side risk and may at the same time reduce buyer-side costs.   
Based on our analysis of interviewee comments, we conclude Proposition 5 is 
supported.  In nearly all cases, buyers and suppliers considered collective risk as a 
significant factor in determining desired contract duration.   
 
  
3.5.6  Evaluation of Proposition 6:  Contract Duration and Supplier-side  
          Investment 
 
Proposition 6.  A long-term buyer-supplier contract enables supplier-side 
strategic investment. 
 
 
Findings:  Supported.  Supplier-side investment is often linked to specific 
customers in the public/private partnership model.  For example, one supplier executive 
stated, “we are committed to supporting our customers.  What they don’t understand is 
that our commitment involves risks—financial risks, opportunity risks, and risks to our 
employees and shareholders.”  This point is reflective of suppliers whose products or 
 45 
 
services are customer unique and have very little, if any, transferable value to another 
customer.  Most suppliers interviewed perceived shorter duration contracts as an 
impediment to making investments which could significantly improve contract objective 
achievement and improve overall customer support. 
When interviewees were asked about optimal contract duration which would 
facilitate supplier-side investment, most suppliers suggested contracts should have a 
duration of greater than three years, ideally five to seven years.  This assumes investment 
is made in year one and two, allowing for recoupment of investment costs and 
achievement of profitability targets years three, four and five.  These finding suggest the 
long-term contract serves as the foundation from which the strategic investment decision 
is formed and provides the framework for recouping buyer-specific investment cost.  
Without longer-term contracts, supplier-side investment exposes the supplier to 
unacceptable levels of risks.  Most suppliers agreed that short-term contracts provide no 
incentive for suppliers to make investments beyond those minimally required to meet 
contract performance objectives. 
Our research indicates that suppliers engaged in public/private partnerships which 
require significant supplier-side investment in order to achieve buyer-side contract-
specific objectives or to improve overall supply chain performance are dependent upon 
longer-term contracts.  Given these findings, we conclude that Proposition 6 is supported. 
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3.6  Conclusions 
 
Our research assessed factors perceived to influence the collective buyer-supplier 
risk position and the effect this risk position may have on contract duration in 
public/private partnerships.  We examined the linkage between buyer-supplier risk 
position, contract duration and supplier-side investment.  We found that longer-term 
contracts enable both buyers and suppliers to mitigate contract-specific risks and 
facilitate supplier-side investment.  Table 5 below summarizes the research findings.  
 
Table 5 - Proposition Summary of Findings 
 
Proposition Results Summary of Findings
Proposition 1a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s 
partnership motive is an important influential factor in 
determining the buyer-side risk position.
Not Supported
Proposition 1b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s 
partnership motive is an important influential factor in 
determining the supplier-side risk position.
Not Supported
Proposition 2a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s 
relationship trust is an important influential factor in 
determining the buyer-side risk position.
Partially Supported
For contracts with new suppliers, market research replaces the 
need for trust and therefore trust does not significantly contribute to 
the buyer-side risk position.  Trust does however contribute to 
buyer-side risk position during contract extension / renewal.
Proposition 2b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s 
relationship trust is an important influential factor in 
determining the supplier-side risk position.
Partially Supported
Buyer relationship trust is much less significant in short-term,  
transactional contract relationships than for long-term contracts. 
Suppliers consider the buyer's ability to protect company brand and 
proprietary information a contributing trust-related risk factor.
Proposition 3a. Buyer’s perception of the supplier's 
capability to achieve contracted product or service 
outcomes is an important influential factor in determining 
the buyer-side risk position.
Supported
Buyers evaluate the supplier's products, as well as services, with 
respect to their capability to achieve contract-specific objectives. 
Buyers assign risk based on the supplier's demonstrated past 
performance which directly influences buyer-side risk position.
Proposition 3b. Supplier’s perception of the buyer's 
capability to achieve contracted product or service 
outcomes is an important influential factor in determining 
the supplier-side risk position.
Supported
Suppliers consider the buyer's contract performance objectives and 
how these objectives can be achieved.  Two issues are identified: 
buyer's role in accurately defining requirements and development of 
supporting metrics or performance measures.
Proposition 4a. Buyer’s responsibility for achieving intra-
firm financial objectives is an important influential factor 
in determining the buyer-side risk position.
Supported
Proposition 4b. Supplier’s responsibility for achieving 
intra-firm financial objectives is an important influential 
factor in determining the supplier-side risk position.
Supported
Proposition 5. Buyer-supplier perception of the collective 
risk position directly influence desired contract duration. Supported
From the buyer's perspective, shorter-term contracts are preferred 
for achieving objectives with low to medium risk. Longer-term 
contracts support achievement of objectives involving higher risks or 
uncertainties.  Suppliers prefer to have a contract of sufficient 
duration to mitigate risks i.e., financial or performance risks. Buyers 
suggest contract structure is more important than duration while 
suppliers perceive contract duration is more important if the focus is 
on achieving cost reduction objectives.
Proposition 6.  A long-term buyer-supplier contract 
enables supplier-side strategic investment. Supported
Most suppliers agreed that short-term contracts provide no 
incentive for suppliers to make investments beyond those minimally 
required to meet contract performance objectives. Contract 
duration greater than 3 years is desired to enable supplier-side 
investment, 5-7 years is considered optimal.
10 of 15 interviewees ranked Partnership Motive as the least 
influential factor of four considered to contribute to the buyer-
supplier risk position.  Buyers and suppliers agree that the other 
participants motive is important and suggest 'motive alignment' is an 
enabler of successful buyer-supplier relationships.  However, in 
public/private partnerships, partnership motives do not appear to be 
considered as a factor significantly contributing to the overall buyer-
supplier risk position.
Buyers and suppliers both seek to minimize financial risk exposure.  
Buyers seeking to reduce cost must engage suppliers in 
development of cost cutting strategies.  Suppliers seeking to 
maximize relational profits over the long term must be willing to 
share cost build up with buyers and work toward mutually 
agreeable costing strategies.  Both buyers and sellers see 
Financial Objectives as one of the most important factors 
contributing to the buyer-supplier risk position. 
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Our findings suggest that buyers and suppliers consciously evaluate perceptions 
of collective risk—Perception of Relationship Trust, Performance Objectives, Financial 
Objectives—and that Partnership Motive is not specifically considered in terms of risk in 
public/private partnerships.  Partnership Motive is considered important in terms of 
achieving ‘motive alignment’ due to the recognition that contract objective achievement 
can be accomplished when buyers and suppliers have a shared understanding of the 
objectives and measures of performance. 
For buyers, shorter term contracts are preferred for public/private partnerships 
involving low to medium risks.  These shorter term contracts are perceived to support 
public agency objectives to reduce contract costs and grow the competitive supplier base.  
However, suppliers perceive shorter term contracts actually increase buyer-side costs 
because suppliers must recoup contract-specific costs upfront.  Our empirical research 
supports the supplier’s perspective and is consistent with the statement appearing in the 
Carr and Pearson (1999) article, “the use of purchasing practices that increase 
competition among suppliers tends to increase the cost of the supplier’s production.”  
In those instances where contract objectives involve higher risks or uncertainties 
(i.e., new technology development) buyers prefer to execute longer term contracts.  
Buyers perceive these longer term contracts afford suppliers opportunity to achieve 
process or technology stabilization.  Suppliers also use contract duration as a primary 
mechanism to mitigate risks. While both buyers and suppliers view longer term contracts 
as an appropriate approach for addressing risk and uncertainty, some buyers suggest 
contract structure (i.e., terms and conditions of payment) may better address this risk.  
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The contract duration desired by suppliers is one which sufficiently supports firm-
specific objectives, including those objectives tied to certain elements of risk.  In order 
for suppliers to make significant investment, they suggest the optimal contract duration is 
greater than three years, ideally five to seven years.  Without longer-term contracts, 
suppliers are exposed to unacceptable levels of risk which may prohibit supplier-side 
investment. 
 
3.7  Implications for Public/Private Partnerships 
 
In public/private partnerships, long-term formal contracts serve as a bridge to 
supplier-side investment.  Public agencies may face contract policy limitations which 
would prevent execution of buyer-supplier contracts of sufficient duration to support this 
investment.  As referenced at the beginning of this article, buyers may perceive suppliers 
as opportunistic, advantage seeking agents or as cooperating partners.  Given the critical 
importance of the current public agency budget crisis, and based upon our research 
findings, we recommend buyers seek to collaboratively develop contracts with key 
suppliers to identify ways to reduce buyer-side costs.  In turn, suppliers should seek 
opportunities to engage with public agency buyers, contracting officials and 
administrators with the intent of sharing their supplier-side perspectives and lessons 
learned.  Buyers and suppliers should work together to develop strategic policy 
approaches which will minimize buyer- and supplier-side risks and at the same time 
reduce buyer-side costs. 
An essential element to successfully achieving buyer-side cost reductions is the 
recognition that suppliers have the ability to drive down contract related costs.  This may 
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be achieved in several ways, including supplier-side investment in process and/or 
technology improvements which in many public/private partnerships are contract- or 
customer-specific improvements.  From the supplier’s perspective, consideration of these 
potential investments is predominantly tied to achievement of contract performance 
objectives.  If the focus is on reducing buyer-side costs, efforts should be made to work 
with the supplier to address the question, “what contract structure and duration will best 
facilitate achievement of the contract objectives and at the same time reduce our agency’s 
overall costs?”  Working through these types of questions should enable buyers and 
suppliers to align expectations and minimize buyer- and supplier-side costs. 
In public/private partnerships, buyers and suppliers may have competing financial 
objectives.  Buyers may seek to minimize expenditure of tax payer dollars while suppliers 
may seek to achieve contract-specific profitability targets.  We suggest both positions 
may be achieved through a shared understanding of perceived risks and the disclosure of 
supplier-side costs and expected profitability.  This risk-reward approach may enable 
buyers to execute contracts of sufficient duration to facilitate the supplier-side 
investments necessary to reduce buyer-side costs, meet or exceed contract performance 
objectives and achieve supplier profitability targets. 
Our research findings suggest a risk-reward approach may be difficult in light of 
the apparent disconnect between buyer and supplier views concerning short-term 
contracts.  Buyers stated that short-term contracts serve to expand the supplier base, 
increase competition and reduce buyer-side costs.  In contrast, suppliers perceive short-
term contracts as more expensive and as impediments to supplier side investment which, 
if made, could significantly improve their ability to achieve contract performance 
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objectives and reduce buyer-side costs over time.  Our research findings suggest there 
may be a way to bridge this different view points while leveraging short-term contracts to 
encourage supplier-side investment and achieve performance and cost reduction 
objectives.  The approach involves a series of short-term contracts, one base period and 
multiple regenerating option periods (where a new option period is added each time an 
option period is executed).  This approach extends the duration of an initial single-period 
contract to a total of five years or more, the duration suggested by suppliers as being 
sufficient to support supplier-side investment and the investment recovery. 
Figure 7 illustrates this approach using a base contract duration of two years with 
multiple regenerating one year options.  Base contract durations can be extended or 
compressed in order to comply with current government purchasing regulations, but the 
overall regeneration concept can still be applied.  While some suppliers treat the base 
duration contracts themselves as the recovery investment period (while ignoring future 
option years that haven't been exercised), other suppliers view the entire base duration 
contract and the option years (even though unexercised) as being the investment recovery 
period due to the high rate at which such options have historically been exercised.  
However, as a caveat, past public agency buyer behavior may not be indicative of future 
behavior in terms of the frequency in which options may be exercised in a constrained 
budgetary environment.      
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Figure 7 - Regenerating Contract Approach 
 
An approach like that illustrated in Figure 7 may create the environment 
necessary for suppliers to make investment commitments.  We accept that this approach 
may not be feasible if the recommendations and suggestions outlined above in this 
section are not also considered.  Buyers and suppliers should consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of this approach, as well as the implications to buyer-side contract policy 
and supplier-side investment positions.   
Suppliers engaged in public/private partnerships should seek opportunities to 
examine intra-firm financial and risks tolerance strategies in light of the on-going cuts to 
public agency funds.  The case for longer term contracts can be made if there is clear 
evidence provided by suppliers which indicates contracts in excess of three years are an 
essential element in achievement of both buyer- and supplier-side objectives. 
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3.8  Future Research 
 
Building upon the propositions presented in this article, there appears to be a need 
to further examine similarities and differences between public/private partnerships and 
buyer-supplier partnerships existing completely within the private sector.  This may 
uncover dissimilarities between public/private partnerships and those supply chain 
relationships, partnerships and alliances addressed in the current supply chain literature.  
Additionally, our research findings suggest the need for researchers to consider the 
following question, “does a lack of supplier-side investment due to contract duration 
constraints cause buyers to consider insourcing those operations so that they can make 
the necessary investments themselves?”  Lastly, we suggest focus be given to the effect 
insourcing will have on public/private partnership and contract relationships in the future. 
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4.0  Academic Paper #2 – Buyer Beware: Nearshoring, Reshoring and Insourcing 
—Moving  Beyond the Total Cost of Ownership Discussion 
 
 
4.1  The Location Specific Manufacturing Shift 
 
For nearly 35 years, U.S. manufacturers have leveraged outsourcing as a 
predominant business strategy.  In its infancy, outsourced manufacturing was seen as a 
way to minimize or eliminate those manufacturing functions which the focal firm did not 
consider a core competency or which did not directly add to the firm’s competitive 
advantage in the market.  In more recent years, executives have viewed overseas 
outsourced manufacturing as a strategic 
approach for decreasing labor-related costs in 
the production of components, commodities 
and end items. While core competency and 
competitive advantage remain important focus 
areas, labor costs in overseas manufacturing 
markets are increasing and many firms are 
evaluating opportunities to relocate manufacturing nearer to, or even within, the U.S.  As 
location-specific manufacturing begins to shift from overseas outsourcing toward 
nearshoring, reshoring and insourcing (Figure 8), manufacturing and supply chain 
executives may find themselves facing very difficult relocation decisions.  The outcome 
of any manufacturing relocation decision may systematically alter the focal firm’s global 
manufacturing and supply chain strategies.  
Over the last three decades, outsourcing has been exhaustively studied by industry 
professionals and academic researchers alike.  Collectively they have developed 
Focal Firm 
(Insourcing)
Local 
Outsourcing
Regional                
Outsourcing
National Outsourcing 
(Within U.S.)
Nearshore Outsourcing                    
(e.g., South America)
Overseas Outsourcing
(e.g., China)
Outsourced Manufacturing Opportunity Spectrum
Rearshore Outsourcing                    
(e.g., North America)
Figure 8 - The Outsourcing-to-Insourcing Shift
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comprehensive answers to the ‘why?’, ‘how?’, ‘what?’, ‘where?’ and ‘when?’ 
outsourcing-related questions.1  The outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing shift will 
also provide abundant opportunities to address these same questions from different 
perspectives in the years ahead.  Unfortunately for today’s decision makers, there are 
very few industry-specific ‘lessons learned’, and even fewer academic journal articles 
they can reference to help guide them through the myriad of manufacturing and supply 
chain complexity issues they will undoubtedly face as the anticipated manufacturing 
shifts occur.  
Over the last year we have worked with several large, mid-size and small 
manufacturing firms to gain an in-depth understanding of the critical information needed 
by senior decision makers prior to entering into a manufacturing relocation decision.2 We 
have prepared this as an initial information framework for decision makers, regardless of 
where they are in their relocation decision making process.  Our findings will benefit 
those firms just beginning to discuss options for relocating manufacturing functions as it 
will help them identify critical pre-decision information gaps. However, we also know 
this: this information is late to need if a firm is already fully engaged in relocating its 
outsourced manufacturing functions.  We know this to be true based on the number of 
firms who shared with us that the information they based their relocation decision 
 
 
 
1. For example see Hatonen, J. and T. Eriksson (2009), “30+ Years of Research and Practice of 
Outsourcing – Exploring the Past and Anticipating the Future,” The Journal of International Management, 
Vol. 15, pp. 142-155. 
2.  We would like to thank the following firms for their support of this study:  AeroJet,  American Axel 
Manufacturers, Cox Manufacturing, Deere & Company, E&R Industrial, Evenflo, M2 Global 
Technologies, PEPSICO, Pratt & Whitney, Sulzer Metco, The Triumph Group, and Westinghouse. 
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on was incomplete at best, producing outcomes that did not position the firm to achieve 
its initial near-term cost reduction or efficiency improvement targets. 
We also recognize there may be firms who are relatively new to the 
‘manufacturing renaissance’ discussion.3  As Charles Fine (2000)4 identified, industry 
business cycles are dynamic and there identifiable mechanisms which force industries to 
change over time.  Fine’s research centers on the speed at which supply chain evolution 
occurs in industry.  His findings provide insight into the foundational principals of supply 
chain design concerning outsourcing and equally apply to the manufacturing relocation 
shift of nearshoring, reshoring and insourcing.  For those firms entering into the 
discussion, it appears this information will support any firm-level effort to develop a 
strategic approach for evaluating current outsourced manufacturing relationships and help 
position the firm for success in any future manufacturing relocation decisions. 
 
 
4.2  The Decision Maker’s Challenge 
 
Making executable and supportable decisions concerning outsourced 
manufacturing functions requires decision makers to evaluate a broad spectrum of 
information.  In considering opportunities to shift or relocate outsourced manufacturing, 
access to information is critical.  We found the information used by decision makers 
whose managers were directly involved in the outsourced manufacturing functions and 
upstream supply chain structures was much more accurate and complete than the 
information used by firms who predominantly focused only on cost-related factors.   
3.  For example see B. McMeekin and E. McMackin, “Reshoring U.S. Manufacturing: A Wave of the 
Present,” September 2012, BusinessClimate.Com 
4. Fine, Charles H. (2000), “Clockspeed-based Strategies for Supply Chain Design,” Production and 
Operations Management, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp 213-221. 
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We also discovered a high degree of inconsistency associated with the inclusion 
of process complexity factors as critical information inputs needed by decision makers 
prior to beginning the manufacturing relocation decision making process.  In several 
cases we reviewed, the importance of considering process complexity factors, in addition 
to financial factors, was not discovered until late into the relocation decision making 
process or worse, after the relocation decision had been made.  It is for this reason that 
we suggest the need for firms to move beyond the total cost of ownership (TCO) 
discussion when considering nearshoring, reshoring or insourcing options. 
TCO, as generally applied, includes cost-related elements of interest which can be 
quantified and traced directly to a specific cost allocation strategy.  Some TCO models 
may include upwards of 20 or 30 different data elements which are required in order to 
populate the full model.  For large firms, with experienced staffs qualified to create the 
objective financial data or develop assumption-driven financial data, running full-scale 
TCO models may be appropriate.5  TCO models can also be tailored and many mid-size 
and small firms tailor their TCO model in order to create high-level cost comparisons.  
This normally includes costs allocated to overhead, fixed plant and equipment, labor 
(direct and indirect), inventory (e.g. acquisition and carrying costs), distribution and 
transportation, and cash-to-cash cycle times.  In either case, cost-based decision making 
looks for opportunities which afford the firm the ability to recognize a reduction in total 
ownership cost (RTOC).  If the initial model output does not produce an acceptable 
RTOC, firms may re-evaluate TCO assumptions and re-run the model.   
 
5.  For example see Ellram, Lisa and Arnold B. Maltz (1995), “The Use of Total Cost of Ownership 
Concepts to Model the Outsourcing Decision”, The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol 6, 
No. 2, pp 55-66.  
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Figure 9 – Cost-based Decision Making Approach 
 
In addition to financial factors, including the re-evaluation of modeling 
assumptions, firms needed accurate and complete information about the outsourced 
manufacturer’s manufacturing and supply chain processes.  Firms identified the need to 
access process-related information in order to fully evaluate the ‘as-is’ manufacturer 
against any ‘to-be’ relocation opportunity.  
The challenge for decision makers is to determine what financial and process 
complexity factor information is needed and then to select the best approach for obtaining 
the information given the relationship between the focal firm and the outsourced 
manufacturer.  In hindsight, determining that evaluating financial factors alone was 
insufficient, firms recognized the key question that needed to be addressed prior to 
entering into the relocation decision process was, “how much information do we have 
about our current manufacturer’s costs, manufacturing processes and supply chain 
structure?”  Without this information, embedded manufacturing and supply chain 
structure complexities often adversely affected the evaluation outcome and ultimately the 
achievement of near-term cost savings, productivity and quality improvements, and the 
firm’s ability to achieve internal or customer-driven performance targets.  This is best 
exemplified by one decision maker’s statement, 
Total Cost of Ownership
Financial Factors
Cost-based 
Decision 
Making
Relocate
RTOC
Yes
Re-evaluate 
Assumptions
RTOC
No
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It was a selection criteria mistake early in the process.  We made the 
decision without understanding all of these things.  We went to a new 
supplier that had never done (manufactured) the products…we went to 
them because of costs and at the end of the day neither the design nor the 
manufacturing ability was there to do it economically and it was a huge 
mess for both of us. (Senior Manager, Research Participant, Anonymity 
Requested) 
 
Throughout our analysis of relocation decision making processes, it became 
increasingly clear to us that firms lacked a detailed understanding of the process 
complexities embedded in their outsourced manufacturing relationships.  This lack of 
understanding limited the decision makers’ ability to identify and then obtain the 
information needed to fully evaluate the spectrum of manufacturing relocation options. 
 
4.3  Reacting to Trigger Events 
The need to produce near-term results often serves as the mechanism for change.  
For example, we did not find evidence that firms have fully embraced nearshoring, 
reshoring and insourcing as a corporate strategy.  Instead, in each and every case there 
was a unique trigger event which caused the firm to begin discussing the possibility of 
relocating the outsourced manufacturing function.  The primary drivers for relocating 
outsourced manufacturing workload most often referenced were cost reduction, quality 
improvement, and productivity improvement.  Example triggers cited included 
unanticipated costs increases from the manufacturer, inability of the manufacturer to 
consistently meet quality and delivery standards, and the need to improve the firm’s 
internal equipment and capacity utilization to better distribute overhead costs. 
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Because the relocation decision making process began as a response to a trigger 
event, superficial and easily obtainable financial or cost-related factors often served as 
the primary criteria to evaluate relocation options.  In our discussions with senior 
decision makers, we discovered that there were very few who had access to complete 
information concerning the complexities of existing outsourced manufacturing functions.  
This further supports our conclusion that many of these relocation decisions were near-
term reactions to one or more trigger events and not part of a strategic manufacturing 
relocation plan where financial factors and process complexity factors should have been 
developed and evaluated.  It was these insights which lead us to create an information 
flow framework that identifies critical information flows associated with financial and 
process complexity factors. 
 
4.4  Critical Information Flows 
Our findings support development of financial factors using TCO modeling, full 
or tailored depending upon the firm’s unique requirements.6  However, as stated earlier, 
financial models alone have proven insufficient for identifying the hidden costs 
associated with engineering design and manufacturing, and supply chain structure 
complexity factors.  We illustrate these critical information flows in Figure 10 where we 
incorporate financial factors and process complexity factors in parallel.  Here we are 
suggesting independent development and analysis of financial and process complexity 
factors but also recognize that there are linkages between these overarching factors. 
 
6.  For example see The Reshore Initiative at http://www.reshorenow.org/TCO_Estimator.cfm 
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These linkages need to be formalized into a single information flow to ensure 
decision makers have timely, accurate and complete information prior to any 
manufacturing relocation decision.    
 
Figure 10 – Financial and Process Complexity Factors 
 
4.5  How You Got In May Determine How You Get Out 
Experience garnered from participating firms has shown that process-unique 
complexities must be considered by decision makers.  Obtaining process complexity 
information may prove to be a time consuming and difficult task.  We discovered that a 
firm’s access to process complexity information heavily depends on three factors: 
 
1) Type of firm-manufacturer relationship in place 
 
2) Firm’s ability to control or influence specific process elements within the  
    relationship 
 
3) Duration and quality of the focal firm-manufacturer relationship   
 
 
At its height of appeal as a business strategy, firms entered into outsourced 
manufacturing relationships expecting to recognize immediate benefits (e.g., lower 
production costs).  Many of these relationships were developed focusing on near-term 
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objectives and, therefore, the focal firm may not have considered the strategic 
implications of their relationship development decision. In many cases, the type of 
relationship formed directly affected the firm’s ability to access process-unique 
information needed as a baseline for evaluating the ‘as-is’ outsourced manufacturer 
against any ‘to-be’ manufacturing relocation opportunity.  Although each firm–
manufacturer relationship is unique, we have generalized our findings in order to support 
a broad application of interests.  We have included general examples and supporting 
details provided by participating firms which are not specifically attributed at the request 
of the participating firms to provide anonymity.  
 
4.6  Process Control and Information Access 
 
We have identified three primary types of outsourced manufacturing relationships 
and have generalized the focal firm’s degree of control or influence over areas such as 
design, engineering and manufacturing, quality standards and costs for each relationship.  
We discuss each relationship type and the implications of the firm’s degree of process 
control or influence on their ability to access process complexity information.  The 
framework should assist decision makers in their efforts to identify, understand and 
evaluate specific manufacturing process element complexities which may impact the 
manufacturing relocation decision.  
We introduce the framework in Table 6 representing the focal firm’s general ‘as-
is’ position of control or influence in the three outsourced manufacturing relationships: 
Custom Manufacturing, Customization of Standardized Products, and Standardized 
Products.  The underlying characteristic of the three relationships is that of asset 
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specificity.  From the focal firm’s perspective, as asset specificity decreases so also does 
the focal firm’s degree of control or influence over manufacturing process elements 
within the relationship.  As a result, the focal firm becomes much more reliant upon its 
relationship with the outsourced manufacturer to obtain the detailed information needed 
to support the manufacturing relocation decision making process. 
Table 6 – The Focal Firm-Outsourced Manufacturer Relationship 
 
 
4.6.1  Custom Manufacturing 
This relationship is developed between the focal firm and an outsourced 
manufacturer for the purpose of having a manufacturer produce a component or end-item 
in accordance with the focal firm’s specific product design, engineering specifications, 
manufacturing specifications, and preferred manufacturing processes. For each of these 
elements, the focal firm may afford some consideration to the outsourced manufacturer 
based on the manufacturer’s unique equipment or facility capabilities.  Even as this 
consideration is given, the focal firm retains a very high degree of control or influence 
Relationship 
Type
Product Design
Engineering 
Specifications
Manufacturing 
Specifications
Manufacturing 
Processes
Manufacturing 
Standards or Metrics
Production Quality 
Control Metrics
IT Integration 
Strategies
Workforce Capabilities
Unit Level Costs
Firm 
Perspective
Engineering 
Design and 
Manufacturing 
Process Elements
Degree of Control or Influence Degree of Control or Influence Degree of Control or Influence
Focal Firm
Custom Manufacturing Customization of Standardized Products Standardized Products
(+)  <--------------------------------------Asset Specificity--------------------------------------->  (-)
Manufacturer Focal Firm Manufacturer Focal Firm Manufacturer
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over the manufacturing standards or metrics, and production quality control metrics.  This 
control or influence may be extended through the relationship duration and is more 
formally exercised as part of the focal firm’s first article testing and final product 
acceptance procedures. 
In the custom manufacturing relationship, the focal firm’s ability to control or 
influence the outsourced manufacturer’s information technology (IT) integration strategy 
is somewhat limited to the degree the manufacturer is willing to modify its internal IT 
and data architecture.  The manufacturer may facilitate integration with the focal firm in 
order to electronically exchange design, engineering or manufacturing specifications 
during the course of the relationship.  The manufacturer may also make IT architecture 
modifications to electronic data interchange (EDI) capabilities to support integration with 
the focal firm’s demand forecasting, in-transit visibility and/or payment systems.   
Workforce capabilities may be influenced by the focal firm in terms of directing 
the manufacturer to utilize personnel with specific skill-levels or certifications in the 
manufacturing and production process as a condition of the relationship.  This 
relationship type also affords the focal firm the greatest degree of control or influence 
concerning unit level costs.  The focal firm has a higher degree of positional power in 
terms of negotiating workforce capabilities and unit level costs than the outsource 
manufacturer entering into the relationship if there is an acceptable level of qualified 
competition in the manufacturing market.  
On the surface, based on the focal firm’s degree of control or influence, it would 
appear the focal firm–custom manufacturer relationship leaves little to address 
concerning process complexity factors.  The focal firm has a significant position of 
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control throughout the relationship period and should have all information needed to 
support the manufacturing relocation decision.  Except for limited considerations, the 
focal firm should have a detailed understanding of all process complexity factors and 
access to pertinent information needed to support evaluation of manufacturing relocation 
options.  However, our study exposed the focal firm–custom manufacturer outsourced 
manufacturing relationship as one that is most likely to cause significant difficulty in 
successfully relocating manufacturing workload.  There were two primary findings which 
were discovered by firms late into the relocation decision making process that support 
this conclusion: 
Finding One.  Focal firms did not have an awareness of the degree to which the 
outsourced manufacturer had absorbed manufacturing-related costs (i.e., scrap and re-
work) in order to meet the focal firm’s quality and costs objectives.  So although the focal 
firm’s degree of control or influence was significantly higher than that of the outsourced 
manufacturer, once first article testing was completed the focal firm relied primarily on 
performance metrics such as costs, schedule and quality which did not provide any level 
of detail into the actual manufacturing and production processes.  
Finding Two.  Focal firms were not aware of the degree to which their outsourced 
manufacturers had become reliant on the use of non-standard processes (e.g., 
manufacturing or production ‘work-arounds’) in order to minimize manufacturing costs 
and maximize profits.  The use of non-standard processes has often been referred to 
‘hidden factories’ in the Lean / Six Sigma literature to address the difference between 
actual versus stated or perceived processes.  
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It is important to note that neither of these major issues would have been captured 
as information inputs if the focal firm’s decision making process was primarily dependent 
upon financial models.  More importantly, these are examples where the focal firms 
believed they had all of the information needed going into the decision making process 
because they believed their degree of control or influence in the relationship provided 
them information access.  As a result the information used by decision makers in the 
evaluation of relocation opportunities was still inaccurate and incomplete. 
 
4.6.2  Customization of Standardized Products 
 
In the second relationship the focal firm engages with a manufacturer of 
standardized products from which the focal firm seeks to customize one or more of the 
products in the manufacturer’s product portfolio.   There are, of course, varying degrees 
of customization which could occur.  As the degree of customization increases (i.e., 
increased asset specificity), the focal firm achieves a higher degree of control and 
influence in the relationship.  While the manufacturer owns the foundational product 
design, engineering specifications, etc., it is the focal firm’s customization of the 
standardized product(s) which affords it a limited degree of control and influence over 
the range of process elements. 
In comparing this relationship to custom manufacturing, we see the manufacturer 
relinquishes varying degrees of control as necessary to support the focal firm’s objectives 
to achieve desired design, engineering and manufacturing, and quality specifications.  
The focal firm has a decreased degree of control over quality standards and unit-level 
costs are viewed as a shared or negotiated position.  As we have suggested for the focal 
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firm-custom manufacturing relationship, a detailed analysis of the end-to-end engineering 
and manufacturing processes, including standards / metrics, should be incorporated into 
the information flow.  Additionally, information concerning the approach taken by the 
focal firm to negotiate quality and costs thresholds should also be incorporated.  With this 
inclusive approach, decision makers will have a more accurate and complete 
understanding of the outsourced manufacturer’s engineering, manufacturing, quality and 
costs elements associated with the focal firm-customization of standard parts outsourced 
manufacturing relationship. 
One of the challenges the focal firm may face in its efforts to evaluate relocation 
opportunities is its limited access to the manufacturer’s foundational product design, 
engineering and manufacturing specifications, and production processes.  Ideally, this 
information would have been obtained prior to entering into the relationship as part of the 
initial evaluation of the manufacturer or in the early stages of the relationship as 
associated with the focal firm’s limited degree of control or influence over the process 
elements.  Regardless of how the information was obtained, the timeliness and accuracy 
of the information is important to the relocation decision and this information may have 
changed over time.  It is difficult for decision makers to evaluate tomorrow’s relocation 
opportunities if the information included in the ‘as-is’ basis of comparison is dated. 
 
Finding.  A focal firm had outsourced manufacturing of a partially customized 
subassembly and, through the course of the relationship, had made a significant time 
investment in working to improve the outsourced manufacturer’s production processes 
which the focal firm believed were resulting in unacceptable quality deficiencies.  The 
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quality of the subassembly was improved over time yet still did not meet the focal firm’s 
standard.  The work was subsequently moved to another manufacturer who also produced 
the foundational product.  The second manufacturer faced the same production-related 
quality challenges and the focal firm again made a significant time investment working 
with the manufacturer to improve the quality of the subassembly.  The relocation decision 
did not include the possibility that another manufacturer may also be challenged to meet 
the focal firm’s quality objectives.  As one executive discussed, “…just because 
outsourced supplier X has a problem and supplier Y can manufacture the same product, 
don’t assume supplier Y can fix the problem.”  The relocation decision resulted in the 
same quality-related issues and the focal firm did not achieve its near-term cost or quality 
improvement objectives.  It was not until the focal firm had made a significant time 
investment with the second manufacturer that the production-related issue was 
determined to be a design and integration problem. 
 
4.6.3  Standardized Products 
Here an outsourced manufacturer primarily produces standardized products which 
are sold under one or more brands into multiple markets.  The outsourced manufacturer is 
responsible for product design, engineering and manufacturing specifications, and 
controls its own production processes and quality standards.  The focal firm evaluates the 
manufacturer’s products and, based on pre-determined quality and price targets, selects 
those products from the manufacturer’s product portfolio which will be labeled and sold 
under the focal firm’s brand.  Market conditions may determine the degree to which the 
manufacturer will release partial control over quality and costs in so much as is needed to 
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secure the focal firm’s business.  For this type of outsourced manufacturing relationship, 
the focal firm may have received information concerning the outsourced manufacturer’s 
design, engineering and manufacturing, and quality control processes as part of its initial 
manufacturer evaluation process.  If this detailed analysis was not accomplished, our 
findings suggest that this information should be obtained and included as a critical 
information flow into the relocation decision making process.  However, if there is a 
sufficient number of qualified manufacturers of the standardized product (i.e., suitable 
form, fit and function properties), and switching costs are low, price/costs comparisons 
for standardized product manufacturers may be sufficient to support a manufacturing 
relocation decision.  
Figure 11 captures the primary engineering design and manufacturing process 
complexity factors discussed for each of the three focal firm-manufacturer relationships 
presented.  Managers should develop ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ questions for each complexity 
factor then work with their outsourced manufacturing providers to address each question.      
 
 
Figure 11 – Engineering Design and Manufacturing Complexity Factors 
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4.7 Supply Chain Structure 
In addition to the need for decision makers to consider engineering design and 
manufacturing complexities, we also identified the complexity of the outsourced 
manufacturer’s supply chain structure as a critical information flow which must be 
considered.  The focal firm’s ability to control or influence supply chain structure is also 
linked to the focal firm-manufacturer relationship type. 
The second category of process complexity factors addresses the structure of the 
outsourced manufacturer’s upstream supply chain.  As has been well documented, multi-
tiered upstream supply chain structures become more complex the longer they are in 
place and tend to add significant costs to manufacturing processes (Bozarth et al., 2009).7  
Study participants identified cost reduction as a primary driver for relocating outsourced 
manufacturing workload.  However, without insight into the manufacturer’s supply chain 
structure and an understanding of supply chain-driven costs, decision makers do not have 
a sufficient level of information to correctly evaluate current outsourced manufacturing 
workload against the spectrum of relocation opportunities.  Information concerning the 
evolution of the manufacturer’s supply chain structure and how this evolution may have 
affected production quality and manufacturing costs over time should be identified as a 
critical information flow into the decision making process. Here again, consideration of 
financial factors alone would not provide decision maker’s insight into the upstream 
supply chain structure’s potential cost-drivers and risks.  
 
7. See Bozarth, Cecil C., Donald P. Warsing, Barbara B. Flynn, and E. James Flynn (2009), “The impact of 
supply chain complexity on manufacturing plant performance,” Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 
27, pp 78-93. 
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Table 7 – Influencing the Manufacturer’s Supply Chain Structure
 
 
As shown in Table 7 above, the focal firm’s ability to control or influence the 
manufacturer’s supply chain structure is again a function of asset specificity.  The 
importance of understanding the focal firm’s influential position concerning the supply 
chain structure is tied to the ability to ‘lift and shift’ supplier relationships as part of the 
manufacturing relocation decision.  In the focal firm-custom manufacturing relationship, 
the focal firm has considerable control over the engineering design and manufacturing 
process elements.  This degree of control positions the focal firm to influence material 
quality, material costs and the overall inventory strategy within the manufacturer’s supply 
chain structure.  To a lesser degree, the focal firm has the ability to influence overall 
supply chain performance, supplier selection and supplier performance.  The focal firm’s 
ability to control or influence the supply chain structure decreases as the level of asset 
specificity decreases, to the point where the focal firm has very little control with the 
focal firm-standardized products relationship.  For this relationship type, any ability of 
the focal firm to control or influence the supply chain structure may be limited to quality 
Relationship 
Type:
Overall Supply Chain 
Performance
Supplier Selection
Supplier Performance
Material Quality
Material Costs
Inventory Strategy
Firm Perspective (+)  <-------------------------------------------Asset Specificity-------------------------------------------->  (-)
Focal Firm Manufacturer
Custom Manufacturing Customization of Standardized Products Standardized Products
Supply Chain 
Structure Elements
Degree of Control or Influence Degree of Control or Influence Degree of Control or Influence
Focal Firm Manufacturer Focal Firm Manufacturer
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evaluation and acceptance of lot quantity shipments and an agreed upon inventory 
strategy to meet the focal firm’s product delivery requirements. 
Another level of supply chain structure complexity is associated with the type of 
relationships the manufacturer has developed with its suppliers.  As with the focal firm, 
manufacturers may also be engaged in custom manufacturing, customization of 
standardized products, and standardized products relationships.  As indicated in Figure 
12, each multi-tiered relationship structure must be considered and evaluated by the focal 
firm in order to identify potential cost-drivers or risks within the manufacturer’s upstream 
supply chain structure.  These potential cost-
drivers and risks, along with mechanisms to 
mitigate each, should be carried forward as 
information flows into the manufacturing 
relocation decision making process.  
Without the ability to control or influence 
the upstream supply chain structure, gaining 
access to information about the various supply chain elements may prove difficult. 
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Figure 12 - Upstream Supply Chain Structure Complexity
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4.8  Managing Your Way To Information Access 
We found there are four primary ways focal firms obtain access to manufacturing 
process and supply chain structure complexity information.  Toyota, through its focus on 
supplier relationship development within Toyota Production System (TPS), may best 
exemplify the importance of developing supplier relationships.8 
 
4.8.1  The Handshake:  Developing quality relationships with manufacturers 
 
Access to timely, accurate and complete information is made easier when the 
focal firm’s managers are involved in, not informed of, the manufacturer’s processes.  
Examples of how this can be accomplished would include assignment of one or more 
focal firm employees to work directly with the manufacturer beginning in the early stages 
of the relationship and carrying these same relationships forward through the design, 
manufacturing, production and delivery life-cycle.   
 
 
4.8.2  The Stick:  Leveraging the control or influence over processes 
 
This management approach relies on the focal firm’s ability to use positional 
power to control or influence manufacturing processes and actively participate in 
upstream supply chain structure processes.  Since the firm’s ability to control or influence 
processes is significantly diminished as asset specificity decreases, the firm may be able 
to engage in power trade-offs with the manufacturer in order to access critical 
information.   
 
8. Morgan, J. M., & Liker, J. K. (2006). The Toyota product development system. New York: Productivity 
Press. (pp 199) 
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4.8.3  The By-pass:  Development of relationships with upstream suppliers 
 
If the focal firm has not successfully developed quality relationships with its 
manufacturers, and power trade-offs have not been produced desired results, the firm may 
need to develop relationships with upstream suppliers.  The primary purpose of 
developing these relationships is to obtain access to manufacturing process and supply 
chain structure elements needed to support the manufacturing relocation decision making 
process. Secondary motives for developing these relationships could include the firm’s 
desire to transition the upstream supplier(s) into the relocation supply chain structure.  
Regardless of the rationale, relationships with upstream suppliers provide critical insights 
into supply chain performance attributes needed to inform the relocation decision.  
 
 
4.8.4  The Benchmark:  Leveraging relationships with manufacturers (and 
suppliers) known to use similar processes 
 
In the absence of information specific to the focal firm-manufacturer relationship, 
manufacturing and supply chain structure information may be obtained through 
development of relationships with other firms who have outsourced manufacturing 
workload.  Inter-organization strategy sessions may afford the focal firm access to 
outsourcing manufacturers who perform similar manufacturing functions and provide the 
focal firm an opportunity to develop various ‘as-is’ scenarios to fill information voids in 
the financial and process complexity factor information flows. 
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4.9  More Than The Bottom Line 
The importance of incorporating information concerning the engineering design 
and manufacturing, and supply chain process complexity factors into the relocation 
decision making process cannot be overstated.  Without this information, the focal firm 
has little certainty that the relocated manufacturing processes will achieve the desired 
outcomes of reducing cost, or improving quality and productivity.  This insight further 
supports the need for buyers to move beyond the TCO discussion and work with their 
outsourced manufacturers to obtain timely, accurate and complete information prior to 
entering into a manufacturing relocation decision making process.  The question decision 
makers need to ask is, “what data and information do you have for me to consider on the 
outsourced engineering design and manufacturing processes?” Decision makers should 
not be alarmed that the answers provided may be incomplete and that current 
relationships with manufacturers may not support information access.  Our findings 
suggests very few firms have complete information going into the decision making 
process.  Unless there is an urgent requirement to get to a relocation decision, we would 
encourage decision makers to delay the decision making process.  A fully informed 
relocation decision made tomorrow may prove more beneficial to the long-term bottom 
line than a partially informed decision made today.  A structured delay may ensure 
decision makers have timely, accurate and complete information needed to support 
achievement of the firm’s manufacturing relocation objectives.   
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5.0 Academic Paper #3—An Empirical Investigation of the Manufacturing 
Outsourcing-to-Insourcing Antecedents 
 
5.1  Abstract 
 This research utilizes semi-structured interviews completed with senior executives 
and managers from 12 firms in the manufacturing industry to examine the level of 
perceived influence 23 different factors may have on manufacturing relocation decisions.   
Additionally, 14 specific insourcing cases are evaluated to determine if firm-level 
perspectives of factor influence are consistent with those influential factors identified as 
having the most significant levels of influence on the insourcing decision.  The 
theoretical themes of transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm are evaluated against the primary factors identified as having the most 
significant influence on outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decisions.  
Research propositions are developed based on the results and future research directions 
are addressed. 
 
Key words: outsourcing, insourcing, influential factors, manufacturing relocation    
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5.2  Introduction 
There has been an increasing interest in the use of qualitative case studies as an 
alternative to survey-based research to empirically address current trends in operations 
management (Gray et al., 2013; Barratt, 2011; Stuart et al., 2002).  It would be difficult at 
this early stage to suggest the manufacturing relocation shift (i.e., nearshoring, reshoring, 
and/or insourcing) has become a trend.  However, there is an undeniable focus on 
revitalizing the U.S. manufacturing sector and for academic researchers to make value-
added contributions to this outcome (Gray et al., 2013).  Much of the current focus within 
the practitioner communities has centered on re-addressing firm-level decisions to 
outsource manufacturing functions to overseas locations.  However, to date, there is an 
absence of academic research published which addresses this impending relocation shift.  
Academic research which includes the perspective of practitioners is needed to help 
shape and guide the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation discussion.  
Furthermore, there has been no evaluation of existing theoretical constructs and their 
ability to address the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation shift.     
The absence of academic literature addressing the outsourcing-to-insourcing 
manufacturing relocation shift is understandable.  Outsourcing has served as a primary 
business strategy for U.S. manufacturers for more than three decades.  In response, 
researchers have exhaustively studied the outsourcing phenomenon answering many of 
the ‘why?’, ‘how?’, ‘what?’, ‘where?’ and ‘when?’ questions (e.g., Hatonen and 
Eriksson, 2009).  However, the prominence of outsourcing has begun to decline and 
many firms have cancelled outsourcing contracts or intend to insource functions as 
contracts expire (Gadde and Jonsson, 2007).   
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The evolutionary cycle of the study and practice of logistics has been well 
documented by authors such as Klaus (2009), Stock (2009), Charvet et al., (2008), van 
Hoek (2001), and Ellram et al., (1994).  Each article brings forward a significant basis of 
knowledge and understanding of the past and, in some cases, establishes a foundation for 
the future of supply chain management thought.  However, as Ellram (2013) states, 
“much of the supply chain focus on the manufacturing location decision has been 
subsumed to the outsourcing decision.”  While there are few questions left to address 
concerning outsourcing, the impending outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing 
relocation shift may emerge as the new research frontier.   
The long-standing focus on outsourcing has created an obvious void in the current 
operations and supply chain management literature.  This empirical, qualitative case 
study research begins to fill the gap in the academic literature concerning the impending 
shift in sourcing decisions away from outsourcing toward nearshoring, reshoring and/or 
insourcing.   
The purpose of this research is twofold.  First, we provide a survey of the 
outsourcing literature addressing the primary influential factors considered by firms as 
part of a strategic outsourcing decision.  Secondly, we evaluate these same influential 
factors in an attempt to answer our overarching research question: 
Which, if any, of the influential factors associated with outsourcing are also 
influential in the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation shift and 
why? 
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Over the course of the last year, we have conducted interviews with senior 
executives and managers of 12 companies concerning the manufacturing relocation shift.  
As part of the interview process, we developed 14 specific case studies addressing the 
importance of influential factors in the decision to insource manufacturing functions and 
manufacturing support services.  Our research approach utilizes the themes of transaction 
cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985) and the resource-based view of the firm 
(RBV) (Barney, 1991) to provide the context of examination as called for by McIvor 
(2013).  These themes are applied to the insourcing component of the manufacturing 
relocation shift, allowing us to present an evaluation of the influential factors and lessons 
learned.  We conclude with a few managerial guidelines concerning firm-level evaluation 
of tactical, strategic and enabling influential factors which may impact future 
manufacturing relocation decisions. 
 
 
5.3  A Review of the Literature 
 
As the manufacturing relocation shift is a new phenomenon, it was our intent to 
identify and analyze the factors influential in the context of outsourcing and use these 
factors as a starting point for gaining an understanding of the insourcing implications.  
Numerous researchers have captured the rationale, benefits and potential hazards of 
outsourcing.  In our review of the outsourcing literature, we identified 23 factors which 
researchers have evaluated in the context of outsourcing.  We have captured many of 
these contributions to the literature in Tables 8 and 9 below.  Key elements of each of the 
23 factors are identified immediately follow the tables.   
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We acknowledge that there may be additional factors which we have not captured 
here and, as such, present the contributions in Tables 8 and 9 as representative of the 
many factors which managers have and should consider as part of any manufacturing 
relocation decision.  We provide this qualification in part due to the number of 
‘outsourcing’ related journal articles published since the early 1960’s.  For example, a 
simple query of ‘outsourcing’ on Google Scholar produces over 470,000 returns making 
it nearly impossible to fully evaluate all returns.   
 
Table 8 – Influential Factors (Factors 1-13) 
 
Bozarth, Handfield and Das, 1998; Razzaque 
and Sheng, 1998; Narasimhan and Das, 1999; 
Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Mol, van Tulder 
and Beije, 2005; Kroes and Ghosh, 2010
Dillon, 1989; Sheehan, 1989; Goldberg, 1990; 
Byrne, 1993; Wood, 1993; Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994; Das and Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel, 
2000; Lafferty and Roan, 2000; Barthelemy, 
2001; Barthelemy, 2003; Holweg and Pil, 2008               
Richardson, 1990; Rogers, Dawe and Guerra, 
1991; Sheombar, 1992; Richardson, 1993; 
Richardson, 1995; Williams et al. , 1997; 
Ferrari, 2001; Narasimhan and Kim, 2001; 
Coronado, 2003; Chen and Paulraj, 2004; 
Zacharia and Mentzer, 2004; Sahin and 
Robinson, 2005; Zhou, et al., 2011
Schonberger and Gilbert, 1983; Ansari and 
Modarress, 1986; Wemmerlov and Hyer, 
1989; Benton and Shin, 1998; Carbone, 1999; 
Mentzer, 1999; Fullerton et al. , 2003; 
Zacharia and Mentzer, 2004   
Foster and Muller, 1990; Raia, 1992; Rao and 
Young, 1994; Bradley, 1995; Lieb and 
Randall, 1996; Levy, 1997; Liker and Choi, 
2004; Choi and Krause, 2006; Handley and 
Benton, 2009
Bradley, 1995; Harrington, 1995; van Damme 
and van Amstel, 1996; Sink and Langley, 
1997; Bozarth, Handfield and Das, 1998; 
Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; Schniederjans et 
al. , 2005; Hoecht and Trott, 2006; Kroes and 
Ghosh, 2010
Weber, Current and Benton, 1991; Richardson, 
1993; Cooke, 1994; Leahy, Murphy and Poist, 
1995; Lankford and Parsa, 1999
13--Performance Consequences
7--Improve Productivity
6--Human Resources
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Markides and 
Berg, 1988; Bettis, Bradley and Hamel, 1992; 
Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Bradley, 1995; 
Levy, 1995; van Damme and van Amstel, 
1996; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Barthelemy, 
2003; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Aron and 
Singh, 2005; Blackhurst et al. , 2005; Mol, 
van Tulder and Beije, 2005; Handley, 2012
Hahn, et al., 1983; Helper, 1991; Gillet, 1994; 
Bryce and Useem, 1998; Momme and Hvolby, 
2002; Li (Yuan) et al. , 2008; Handley and 
Benton, 2009; Mahapatra, Narasimhan and 
Barbieri, 2010
Cavinato, 1989; Maltz, 1994; Rao and Young, 
1994; Maltz and Ellram, 1997; Sink and 
Langley, 1997; Boyson et al.,  1999; Insinga 
and Werle, 2000; Quelin and Duhamel, 2003; 
Lieb and Bentz, 2005; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2005
Hubbard, 1993; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994;  Rao 
and Young, 1994; Leahy, Murphy and Poist, 
1995; van Damme and van Amstel, 1996; 
Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; McIvor and 
McHugh, 2000; Gottfredson et al.,  2005
Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Christopher and 
Peck, 2004; Blackhurst et al. , 2005; Mol, van 
Tuller and Beije, 2005; Wagner and Bode, 
2008
Leff, 1974; Monczka and Trent, 1991; 
Monczka and Trent, 1992; Byrne, 1993; Rao, 
Young and Novick, 1993; Murray, Wildt and 
Kotabe, 1995; Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; 
Aron and Singh, 1998
8--Integration of Info. Technologies
9--Just-in-Time Complexities
10--Leverage Supply Chain Management
11--Need for Expertise
12--Outsourcing Risks
1--Contract Strategy
2--Cost Savings/Reduction
3--Focus on Core Competence
4--Global Supply Chain Risks
5--Globalization of Business
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Table 9 – Influential Factors (Factors 14-23) 
 
 
 
Contract Strategy 
 
-Firms benefit from the use of formal contracts with fewer suppliers, particularly 
long-term contracts with fewer suppliers that require the supplier to provide buyers with 
information such as cost, quality and performance measures (e.g., Hahn, Pinto and Brag, 
1983; Helper, 1991) 
Bettis et al. , 1992; Hubbard, 1993; Meijboom 
and Vos, 1997; Bryce and Useem, 1998; 
Elmuti et al. , 1998; Das and Teng, 2000; 
Metters, 2008; Gray et al. , 2009; Kinkel and 
Maloca, 2009; Selviaridis and Spring, 2010; 
Speier et al. , 2011; Zacharia, Sanders, and 
Nix, 2011; Handley, 2012
Blenkhorn and Noori, 1990; Quinn, Doorley 
and Paquett, 1990; Ellram and Cooper, 1993; 
Novack, Rinehart and Langley, 1994; Andraski 
and Novack, 1996; Narasimhan and Kim, 
2001; Choi and Hong, 2002; Fawcett and 
Magnan, 2002; Das, Narasimhan and Tulluri, 
2006; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Chen, 
Daugherty and Landry, 2009; Linktukangas, 
Peltola and Virolainen, 2009
Harrigan, 1985; Kotabe, 1992; Campbell, 1995; 
Bozarth, Handfield and Das, 1998; Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000; Aron and Singh, 2005; Farrell, 
2005; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2005; 
Kremic, Tukel and Rom, 2006
Harrigan, 1985; Rogers, Dawe and Guerra, 
1991; Leahy, Murphy and Poist, 1995; Lewis 
and Talalayevsky, 1997; Sink and Langley, 
1997; Buvik and John, 2000; Ferrari, 2001; 
Zacharia and Mentzer, 2004; Caputo and 
Palumbo, 2005; Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2005; 
Sahin and Robinson, 2005
Kotabe and Murray, 1990; Venkatesan, 1992; 
Fawcett and Scully, 1998; Das and Teng, 
2000; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Mahapatra, 
Narasimhan and  Barbieri, 2010; Handley and 
Benton, 2012
18--Service Improvement
Willard and Savara, 1988; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990; Momme and Hvolby, 2002; 
Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Weidenbaum, 2005; 
Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009
Bozarth, Handfield and Das, 1998; Frohlich 
and Dixon, 2001; Zacharia and Mentzer, 
2004; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2005; Mol, 
van Tulder and Beije, 2005; Kremic, Tukel 
and Rom, 2006; Nayak, Sinha and Guin, 2007; 
Tate, 2009; Kroes and Ghosh, 2010
Maltz, 1995; van Damme and van Amstel, 
1996; Narasimhan and Das, 1999; Frohlich 
and Dixon, 2001; Ten Raa and Wolff, 2001; 
Van Hoek, 2001; Lee, 2002; Holcomb and 
Hitt, 2007; Mukherji and Ramachandran, 
2007; Nayak, Sinha and Guin, 2007; Kotabe 
et al. , 2008
Sink and Langley, 1997; Farrell, 2004; Stack 
and Downing, 2005; Weidenbaum, 2005; Li et 
al ., 2008; Metters and Verma, 2008; Palley, 
2008; Javalgi et al ., 2009
19--Supplier Market Power
15--Quality
16--Rapid Growth
17--Regulatory Change
Foster and Muller, 1990; Kotabe and Murray, 
1990; Bardi and Tracey, 1991; Hubbard, 
1993; Richardson, 1993; Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994; Rao and Young, 1994; Bradley, 1995; 
Lieb and Randall, 1996; Sink and Langley, 
1997; Narasimhan and Jayaram, 1998; 
Krause, 1999; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; 
Stanley and Wisner, 2001; Kremic, Tukel and 
Rom, 2006; Nayak, Sinha and Guin, 2007; 
Tate, 2009
20--Supply Chain Infrastructure Investment
21--Supply Chain Integration
22--Technical Advances
23--Upgrade Information Technologies
14--Proprietary Systems Profitability
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-In some cases, long-term outsourcing contracts may create dependence and 
reduce the firm’s flexibility to respond to market conditions (e.g., Bryce and Useem, 
1998; Handley and Benton, 2009) 
 
-Contract employees may not have incentive to generate innovative ideas which 
could benefit the buyer (e.g., Momme and Hvolby, 2002) 
 
-Accounting for contract-driven indirect costs (i.e., contract monitoring) is an 
important area to be considered, particularly in contracts with Chinese firms seeking 
more formal control in the alliance (e.g., Gillett, 1994; Li (Yaun), 2008) 
 
 
Cost Savings/Reduction 
 
-Management must be aware of competition and remain focused on controlling 
logistics costs in the global market (e.g., Lieb and Bentz, 2005) 
 
-Cost savings is frequently cited as the primary reason for outsourcing (e.g., 
Cavinato, 1989; Maltz and Ellram, 1997; Boyson, et al., 1999) 
 
-Focus on achieving additional cost savings through outsourcing may result in 
firms reducing employees and physical assets (e.g., Quelin and Duhamel, 2003)  
 
 
Focus on Core Competence 
 
-Outsourcing has been identified as the primary strategy for firms desiring to 
focus on core competencies and benefit from the experiences of their suppliers (e.g., Rao 
and Young, 1994; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994) 
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-Outsourcing allows firms to focus on strategic planning to maximize utilization 
of core competencies and create more efficient organizations (e.g., Hubbard, 1993; 
Razzaque and Sheng, 1998) 
 
-Identifying qualified suppliers to provide critical functions not considered core 
competencies of the focal firm should improve overall firm performance (e.g., 
Gottfredson, Puryear and Phillips, 2005) 
 
 
Global Supply Chain Risks 
 
-Outsourcing increases the probability of experiencing supply chain-related events 
which degrade normal business operations (e.g., Blackhurst et al., 2005) 
 
-Risk types have been classified or categorized as: delays, disruptions, systems, 
forecast, intellectual property, procurement, receivables, inventory, capacity (e.g., Chopra 
and Sodhi, 2004) 
 
-Other types of supply chain risks might include information integration, 
knowledge integration, or design integration where detailed disclosure of the firm’s 
critical information may create undesired dependence on the supplier (e.g., Christopher 
and Peck, 2004) 
 
 
Globalization of Business 
 
-Currency fluctuations may provide firms opportunities to expand production 
locations internationally (e.g., Leff, 1974) 
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-In order to improve overall firm performance, firms have been advised to seek 
out ‘best-in-world’ suppliers to acquire components and materials (e.g., Monczka and 
Trent, 1991; Monczka and Trent, 1992) 
 
-Offshoring and outsourcing in the global business environment may produce 
additional challenges for the focal firm, i.e., the lack of advanced information technology 
linking upstream suppliers and logistics support providers in the supply chain (e.g., 
Byrne, 1993)   
 
 
Human Resources 
 
-A firm’s clients may benefit from the outsourcing relationship in that the firm 
may be able to provide their clients with access to expertise or experience that the firm 
did not have (e.g., Dillon, 1989; Goldberg, 1990) 
 
-Outsourcing may allow a firm to repurpose human resources to concentrate on 
those functions which add to the firm’s competitive advantage position in the market 
(e.g., Weber, 1991; Helper, et al., 2000; Holweg and Pil, 2008) 
 
-Outsourcing firms may elect to transfer employees to the outsourcing provider 
(e.g., Barthelemy, 2001) while others may leave due to the uncertainty of the firm’s new 
direction (e.g., Barthelemy, 2003) 
-Firms must protect against the loss of personnel with detailed knowledge of the 
outsourced function (e.g., Lafferty and Roan, 2000) 
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Improve Productivity 
 
-Strategic advantages such as faster deliveries, reduced cycle times, and 
expansion of services are achieved through outsourcing (e.g., Weber, Current and 
Benton, 1991; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Richardson, 1993) 
 
 
Integration of Information Technologies 
 
-Information technologies expand the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Sheombar, 
1992; Coronado, Sarhadi and Millar, 2002) 
 
-Information sharing between the buyer and supplier improves the efficiency of 
supply chain management processes (e.g., Sahin and Robinson, 2005)   
 
-Leveraging the supplier’s information technology enables the focal firm to share 
supply and demand information in real time (e.g., Ferrari, 2001) and reduces uncertainty 
in the supply chain (e.g., Zacharia and Mentzer, 2004) 
 
 
Just-in-Time Complexities 
 
-Manufacturing and production environments benefit from ‘time-based 
competition’ (e.g., Mentzer, 1999) which leverages continuous information exchange to 
reduce inventory levels and improve availability (e.g., Zacharia and Mentzer, 2004) 
 
-Supplier responsiveness is critical to successful JIT efforts (e.g., Carbone, 1999) 
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-Material flow could determine the success or failure in manufacturing and 
production environments, yet JIT programs do not traditionally have the ability to 
respond to demand variability (e.g., Benton and Shin, 1998)  
 
 
Leverage Supply Chain Management 
 
-Outsourcing affords firms opportunities to gain competitive advantage through 
the sharing of innovative approaches and technologies with a small number of diversified 
suppliers (e.g., Foster and Muller, 1990; Raia, 1992) 
 
-Organizations must be committed to outsourcing relationships if they are to 
achieve the full value from outsourcing, including direct and open communication with 
suppliers (e.g., Levy, 1997; Handley and Benton, 2009) 
 
-Outsourcing autonomy can promote supplier innovation and access to expertise 
in technically advanced areas, although too much autonomy can create disintegration of 
activities and objectives (e.g., Choi and Krause, 2006) 
 
 
Need for Expertise 
 
-Outsourcing provides firms access to unique skills and expertise of suppliers, 
including knowledge of customs (e.g., Bradley, 1995; Sink and Langley, 1997; Razzaque 
and Sheng, 1998) 
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-Innovativeness is increased through access to the supplier’s skills and expertise 
which may not have been available in-house (e.g., Schniederjans et al., 2005; Hoecht and 
Trott, 2006) 
 
-Outsourcing may allow the focal firm to fully utilize the specialized skills and 
expertise of its employees which may not be available to competitors (e.g., Kroes and 
Ghosh, 2010) 
 
 
Outsourcing Risks 
 
-Firms may lack the ability to govern the outsourcing relationship due to cultural 
differences, distance, inadequate metrics, and inability to observe supplier actions (e.g., 
Mol, van Tulder and Beije, 2005; Aron and Singh, 2005; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) 
 
-Outsourcing may lead to skill erosion, loss of critical skills, declining innovation 
and/or inability to respond to changing customer requirements (e.g., Handley, 2012; 
Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Bradley, 1995) 
 
-Negative consequences of outsourcing may include larger inventories, greater 
dependence, and the inability to develop new core capabilities (e.g., Levy, 1995; van 
Damme and van Amstel, 1996; Bettis, Bradley and Hamel, 1992) 
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Performance Consequences 
 
-Processes not previously outsourced may become targets for future outsourcing, 
further impacting the firm’s ability to distribute overhead costs or meet other intra-firm 
objectives (e.g., Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Bozarth and Das, 1998; Narasimhan and Das, 
1999) 
 
-Costs savings associated with outsourcing production may be offset against 
increased transaction and logistics costs, or customer consequences (e.g., Mol, van Tulder 
and Beije, 2005; Razzaque and Sheng, 1998) 
 
-The transition to outsourcing may lead to recognition of superior in-house skill 
and ability to achieve higher quality performance, thereby leading to insourcing (e.g., 
Kroes and Ghosh, 2010) 
 
 
Proprietary Systems Profitability 
 
-U.S. manufacturers have witnessed suppliers develop competing brands and 
achieve market dominance (e.g., Willard and Savara, 1988; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Momme and Hvolby, 2002) 
 
-Companies limit their outsourcing to routine tasks in order to prevent inadvertent 
loss of core technologies to vendors who might knowingly steal intellectual property 
(e.g., Weidenbaum, 2005) 
 
-Competitive edge and innovation are directly linked to the ability to prevent 
knowledge leak; protection of proprietary knowledge is critical if firms are to prevent an 
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irrecoverable shift in the balance of power in the outsourcing relationship (e.g., 
Narasimahan and Talluri, 2009; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Momme and Hovlby, 2002) 
 
 
Quality 
 
-Researchers have found that oursourcing leads to improvements in product, 
service and buyer-supplier relationship quality (e.g., Bozarth, Handfield and Das, 1998; 
Nayak, Sinha and Guin, 2007; Tate, 2009; Mol, van Tulder and Beije, 2005) 
 
-If firms are recognized for the high quality of products or services, customers 
may be concerned that outsourcing will harm quality (e.g., Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2005; Kremic, et al., 2006) 
 
-Outsourcing relationships may be improved through the use of detailed contracts 
that address conformance to quality standards for products, services and information 
(e.g., Bozarth and Das, 1998; Frohlich and Dixon, 2001; Zacharia and Mentzer, 2004) 
 
 
Rapid Growth 
 
-Outsourcing may allow the firm to meet dynamic changes to demand, 
productivity and changes to production volumes which impact capacity (e.g., Holcomb 
and Hitt, 2007; Ten Raa and Wolff, 2001; Lee, 2002; van Damme and van Amstel, 1996) 
 
-Outsourcing can support postponement strategies or intermediate stabilization of 
new product lines which may have been made possible through process improvements 
(e.g., Van Hoek, 2001; Maltz, 1995; Nayak, Sinha and Guin, 2007) 
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Regulatory Change 
 
-Regulatory environments are dynamic, each partnering country develops and 
applies policies which serve to increase or decrease promotion of outsourcing as an 
effective strategy for manufacturers (e.g., Farrell, 2004; Stack, Martin and Downing, 
2005) 
 
-International regulations may need to be developed to address global outsourcing 
issues such as protection of proprietary data since many policies (i.e., trade, tariffs) are 
national agreements which may inhibit outsourcing (e.g., Farrell, 2004; Weidenbaum, 
2005; Palley, 2008; Javalgi, Dixit and Scherer, 2009) 
 
-As policies governing global supply chain operations continue to change, there is 
an increased need for advanced logistics and supply chain expertise (e.g., Sink and 
Langley, 1997) 
 
 
Service Improvement 
 
-Outsourcing may promote supplier competition leading to service improvements 
for the firm and downstream customers (e.g., Kotabe and Murray, 1990; Richardson, 
1993; Bradley, 1995; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Stanley and Wisner, 2001) 
 
-Outsourcing may support achievement of cost savings for services.  However, 
services are intangible and cannot be stored, therefore, any failure by the outsourcing 
provider to meet service levels causes the buyer to be reactive (e.g., Sink and Langley, 
1997; Kremic, Tukel and Rom, 2006)  
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Supplier Market Power 
 
-Firms engaging in outsourcing strategies should seek to retain bargaining power 
in the relationship (e.g., Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Handley and Benton, 2012) 
 
-Resource scarcity and small numbers trading impact the firm’s ability to effect 
power sharing in outsourcing relationships (e.g., Fawcett and Scully, 1998; Mahapatra, 
Narasimhan and Barbieri, 2010) 
 
-Firms should evaluate the potential of near-term supplier dependence and 
identify mechanisms for using the market to mitigate dependence over the life of the 
outsourcing contract (e.g., Handley, and Benton, 2012) 
 
 
Supply Chain Infrastructure Investment 
 
-Outsourcing may provide opportunities for firms to discard or transfer physical 
assets (e.g., Bettis, Bradley and Hamel, 1992; Handley, 2012) 
 
-Focus on core competency may lead to development of new infrastructure or 
expansion of existing infrastructure to extend competitive advantage and capture 
additional market share (e.g., Selviaridis and Spring, 2010) 
 
-Outsourcing may present unforeseen risks due to the extension of the global 
supply chain infrastructure (e.g., Speier, et al., 2011) or differences in the dependability 
of infrastructures between countries (e.g., Metters, 2008; Kinkel and Maloca; 2009)  
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Supply Chain Integration 
 
-Outsourcing affords firms the opportunity to develop inter-company relationships 
which integrate supply chain programs and processes, and provide avenues for risks 
sharing (e.g., Fawcett and Magnan, 2002; Ellram and Cooper, 1993) 
 
-Integration with suppliers enhances new product development and access to new 
markets (e.g., Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Lintukangas, Peltola and Virolainen, 2009) 
 
-The ability to integrate supply chain functions may be limited if there are 
differences in firm-level cost or customer strategies (e.g., Chen, Daugherty, and Landry, 
2009) 
 
Technical Advances 
 
-Firms holding close to internal production may remain focused on utilization of 
existing technologies which constrain flexibility (e.g., Harrigan, 1985) 
 
-Dynamic environments accessed through outsourcing allow buyers to develop 
relationships with best-in-class suppliers and take advantage of emerging technologies 
without making internal capital investments (e.g., Gilley and Rasheed, 2000) 
 
-Outsourcing may create situations where firms no longer have the ability to 
recognize technological breakthroughs that could lead to improvements in core 
competencies or competitive advantages (e.g., Kotabe, 1992; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2005)  
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Upgrade Information Technologies 
 
-Implementation of advanced technologies allows firms to increase 
data/information sharing, lower costs, and better control extended supply chains (e.g., 
Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009) 
 
-Information sharing between the buyer and supplier improves the efficiency of 
supply chain management processes (e.g., Sahin and Robinson, 2005)   
 
 
5.4  Theoretical Grounding 
  
In addition to the influential factors above, we include a brief discussion of the 
theoretical themes of transaction cost economics (TCE) and resourced-based view (RBV) 
of the firm.  Researchers have applied these theories in evaluation of processes, 
companies, industries, markets and nation-states.   
 
As manufacturers begin to consider opportunities to reverse manufacturing, 
production and logistics outsourcing decisions, it is imperative to establish a theoretical 
basis for this decision process.  In the absence of research addressing the outsourcing-to-
insourcing manufacturing relocation shift, perhaps the best starting point is to refer back 
to the outsourcing literature.  Busi et al., (2008) provide the following list of theories 
which they found most often referenced in the outsourcing literature.  Busi et al., (2008) 
conclude that transaction cost theory and resourced-based view are the two theories most 
frequently applied by researchers in evaluating the outsourcing phenomenon:  
 
1. Transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985) 
2. Resource-based view (Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972) 
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3. Principal agent theory (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
4. Vertical integration theory (Bain, 1968; Grossman and Hart, 1986) 
5. Strategic management (Quinn and Hillmer, 1994) 
6. Evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Mahnke, 2001) 
7. Relationship market/view (Berry, 1983; Sommer, 2003) 
8. Industrial economics (Porter, 1980) 
9. Strategic alignment theory (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1990) 
10. Core competence theory (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) 
 
Based on the extensive application of TCE and RBV to understand outsourcing, 
we elected to examine the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation shift 
through these theoretical lenses.  Each theory individually adds value and context toward 
an understanding of the manufacturing relocation shift.  However, as identified by 
McIvor (2009), neither TCE nor RBV alone can fully explain the complexities of 
outsourcing.  We look to both theories to aid in providing context for evaluating and 
understanding the complexities of the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing 
relocation shift. 
  
5.4.1  Transaction Cost Economics 
  
TCE may also be equally and broadly applied to insourcing if it is the position of 
firms that the expected cost savings associated with an outsourcing decision were not 
realized.  Key theoretical elements of TCE (Williamson, 1985) are provided below.  
Many of these elements serve as a framework for addressing the outsourcing-to-
insourcing manufacturing relocation shift.  The factors below are modifications of 
Williamson’s 1985 work where he suggests these are the key factors which lead to an 
increase in a firm’s transaction cost: 
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Human Factors: 
Bounded Rationality—the inability to consider every possible outcome 
associated with a transaction over time. 
 
Opportunism—taking actions that act to preserve achievement of self-
interests. 
 
Environmental Factors: 
Uncertainty—the effects of bounded rationality and opportunism are 
worsened due to the inability to identify or account for the unknown.  
 
Small Numbers Trading—the inability to control a desired outcome due to 
limited availability of options within the market. 
 
Asset Specificity—investment in an asset by the focal firm, in the absence of 
equal or greater investment in the asset by the supplier, decreases the focal 
firm’s power position in the relationship and may lead to opportunistic 
behavior by the supplier.   
 
 
The focus of the factors is to assist in identifying a continuum of when it may be 
best to rely on the governance mechanisms of the market to protect the firm’s transaction 
interests and when it is best to utilize mechanisms internal to the firm’s structure.  
Williamson (1985) provides a brief illustration, summarizing that as asset specificity and 
uncertainty increase, so does the opportunism of the market.  Therefore, it is suggested 
that in those cases which meet this criteria it is in the firm’s interest to utilize governance 
mechanisms internal to the firm to control and mitigate transaction-specific costs.  The 
same approach is applied to the element of transaction frequency (small numbers 
trading).  Here Williamson (1985) calls out the loss of comparative advantage as 
transaction frequency significantly increases. Suggesting that as frequency increases the 
firm may be better suited to internalize the transaction function to minimize individual 
production transaction costs.   
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5.4.2  Resource-based View    
 
 As suggested by McIvor (2009), a complimentary theoretical approach to TCE is 
the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm.  This is consistent with Duncan (1998) who 
suggests there is much more to be said concerning why firms outsource than that which is 
captured under TCE.  RBV, like TCE, recognizes the hazards of opportunism and instead 
of addressing opportunism through vertical integration as prescribed under TCE, RBV 
seeks measures to prevent uncertainty in the buyer-supplier exchange.   
 
Applying this in the context of the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing 
relocation shift, where TCE would suggest an absolute vertical integration approach, 
RBV may allow the focal firm to apply several early measures to prevent uncertainty.  In 
other words, RBV would suggest the focal firm would undertake measures to address any 
escalation of uncertainty prior to making the insourcing decision.  An overview of RBV 
(Barney, 1991) is provided below.  As with the elements of Williamson’s TCE, 
components of Barney’s RBV serves as a framework for addressing the outsourcing-to-
insourcing manufacturing relocation shift.  
 
There are two key assumptions made concerning RBV.  First, firms within an 
industry may be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic resources they control.  
Second, these resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, and thus heterogeneity 
can be long lasting.  These key assumptions are the basis of RBV—not all resources 
within the firm (i.e., physical capital, human capital, and organizational capital) are 
strategically relevant.  In other words, not all resources lend themselves to creating and 
sustaining competitive advantage in the market place.  Barney (1991) provides a 
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framework for evaluating whether or not particular firm resources can be sources of 
sustained competitive advantage using the definitions below: 
 
--Competitive Advantage: when a firm is implementing a value creating strategy  
not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors. 
 
--Sustained Competitive Advantage: when a firm is implementing a value creating 
strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this 
strategy (note that sustained competitive advantage is not a time dependent 
outcome). 
 
RBV also addresses what could be considered conditional acceptance of the so-
called ‘first mover advantage’ normally discussed in terms of a firm’s ability to be first to 
market.  Here, Barney (1991) suggests that in industries where all firms are perceived to 
have equal access to and ability to obtain resources, the concept of first mover advantage 
is not a sustained competitive advantage.  In other words, there is an ability to achieve 
short-term competitive advantage as a first mover but not to establish sustained 
competitive advantage. 
 
Barney (1991) describes four attributes a firm’s resources must have in order to 
hold the potential of creating sustained competitive advantage.  These attributes are 
referred to as empirical indicators of the heterogeneity and immobility of a firm’s 
resources necessary for generating sustained competitive advantage.  These attributes 
state that a resource must be 1) valuable, in the sense that it exploits opportunities and/or 
neutralizes threats in a firm’s environment; 2) rare among a firm’s current and potential 
competition; 3) imperfectly imitable; and 4) there cannot be strategically equivalent 
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substitutes for this resource that are valuable but are neither rare nor imperfectly imitable 
(i.e., no perfect substitution) 
 
Applying RBV, we would expect firms to reverse an outsourcing decision in 
response to a perceived threat to competitive advantage.  More so, we would expect to 
see a firm’s decision to insource a process, function or knowledge-based skill that is 
believed to meet Barney’s criteria of valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-
substitutable in order to protect a sustained competitive advantage.  RBV would also 
suggest that firms will re-locate manufacturing functions in an attempt to secure or re-
posture resources in order to gain (or re-gain) competitive advantage that might have 
been lost as a result of the outsourcing decision.  As Prahalad and Hamel (1990) suggest, 
one critical and very relevant point made is that outsourcing may provide a shortcut to a 
competitive position (i.e., short-term cost reduction) but it contributes little to building 
the people-embodied skills needed to sustain product leadership.  Looking at this 
perspective through the lens of RBV, we should expect that the erosion of core 
competence supports an outsourcing-to-insourcing relocation decision.  This decision 
should enable the firm to begin re-securing its core competence base and, in-turn, its 
purposeful and competitive use of resources. 
 
 
 5.4.3  Theoretical Overlap, Divergence and Value Conflict 
 
 McIvor (2013) calls for research to examine the supporting applicability and 
potential contradictions of both TCE and RBV in understanding the manufacturing 
location decision.  As an answer to this call, we provide case-specific outsourcing-to-
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insourcing context for TCE and RBV overlap (i.e., similar prescription), divergence (i.e., 
dissimilar prescription) and/or conflict (i.e., opposing prescription).        
 
 
 5.4.4  Overarching Research Questions 
 
1.  What are the primary influential factors associated with a firm’s outsourcing-
to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision? 
 
2.  Why and how are these primary insourcing influences different from (the same 
as) the primary influences associated with outsourcing? 
 
3.  How do the themes of transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-
based view (RBV) of the firm align with the primary insourcing influences?  
 
 
5.5  Research Method 
 
This research fills an apparent void in the academic literature addressing the 
influential factors (why?) which facilitated a manufacturer’s decision to make an 
insourcing decision.  Qualitative research methods were selected to support this research 
since the primary focus was to address ‘why’ questions concerning the outsourcing-to-
insourcing manufacturing relocation shift. 
 
Hayes (2000) identified the need for “less hypothesis testing and more systematic 
observation to help managers deal with their actual problems.”  As the research centers 
on ‘why’ questions concerning the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation 
shift, Yin (2009) and Ellram (1996) suggests that qualitative, exploratory case study 
research is appropriate.  This is in part due to the uniqueness of the contemporary event 
where there is little prior understanding of the phenomenon.  Coughlin and Coghlan 
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(2002) recommend use of qualitative research methods to develop models and theories to 
explain current phenomena (i.e., the outsourcing-to-insourcing relocation shift). 
   
 
5.5.1  Sample Size 
 
Pratt (2009) states, “unlike quantitative research … there is no magic number of 
interviews or observations that should be conducted in a qualitative research project. 
What is ‘enough’ depends on the question a researcher seeks to answer.”  Witt and 
Redding (2009) suggests qualitative research methods usually make a trade-off between 
sample size and depth of research detail.  Eisenhardt (1989) suggests there is no ideal 
number of cases but 4-10 cases have worked well for most qualitative studies.  Her 
rationale is that researchers using less than 4 cases will find it difficult to convince 
readers of sufficient empirical grounding while those dealing with more than 10 cases 
may find it difficult to “cope with the complexity and volume of data,” gathered.   Ellram 
(1996) identifies the use of 6-10 cases for qualitative research as a sample size 
sufficiently large enough to properly evaluate a set of research propositions.   This body 
of research was developed using 30 interviews completed with 12 different companies, 
and incorporates findings from 14 specific case studies.  Information from the interviews 
and cased studies was used to examine elements of the outsourcing-to-insourcing 
relocation shift and evaluate the themes of TCE and RBV in the context of insourcing. 
 
5.5.2  Sampling Strategy 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) states, “selection of cases is an important aspect of building 
theory from case studies…the concept of population is crucial, because the population 
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defines the set of entities from which the research sample is to be drawn.  Also, selection 
of an appropriate population controls extraneous variation and helps to define the limits 
for generalizing the findings.”  She further adds, “while cases may be chosen randomly, 
random selection is neither necessary, nor preferable.”  Research participants and 
insourcing cases were selected within the manufacturing and manufacturing material 
support industries for analysis as a means of controlling for variation across industries.  
Two units of analysis were examined, 1) the individual firm and 2) the specific in-
sourcing case.   
 
5.5.3  Data Collection 
 Our approach was to gain insight into the experiences of senior executives and 
managers familiar with the rationale and objectives which lead to the outsourcing-to-
insourcing decision.  First, during the data design phase, we applied insights gained from 
the extant literature to develop an interview questionnaire. The primary and secondary 
questions were developed in such a manner as to allow the participants to share their 
unique perspectives.  The interview questions were validated by colleagues who were 
experienced researchers with extensive knowledge of the outsourcing literature.  
Secondly, we selected participants based on their positional responsibilities and 
understanding of the firm’s insourcing strategies.  A total of 30 interviews were 
conducted with “persons who are best informed” (Voss, et al., 2002, pg. 206) of the 
firm’s views on the outsourcing-to-insourcing shift and specific insourcing cases.  
Each interview participant agreed to provide access to company information, 
historical records and additional supporting personnel which would round-out the 
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collection of relevant information.  Twenty-nine interviews took place in-person, one was 
completed via telephone.  All 30 interviews were digitally recorded and professionally 
transcribed in order to support thorough coding and analysis.  We have identified the 
positional titles, number of formal interviews conducted and average duration of each 
interview in Table 10 below.  The names of each participating firm have been omitted at 
their request as a means of protecting proprietary and / or confidential information. 
 
Table 10 – Research Participants 
 
 
Ten primary research questions were addressed during the course of the 
interviews (see Appendix A).  Although each of the 10 questions adds value to the body 
of knowledge, the focus of this current research stream is to present a foundational 
understanding of the factors that are influential in the manufacturing outsourcing-to-
insourcing shift.  During the interviews, senior executives and managers were presented 
with the research question, “How do the following factors influence an insourcing 
decision?” Discussion of each of the 23 factors was informed by the literature as 
presented in Sections 5.3 above.  Secondly, each firm identified a specific insourcing case 
and key personnel familiar with the outsourcing-to-insourcing decision were interviewed.  
Firm Position of Participants # Interviews Interview Duration (Ave.) Firm Position of Participants # Interviews
Interview 
Duration (Ave.)
Vice President, Equipment Operations National Senior Fleet Manager
Manufacturing Engineering Manager State-wide Fleet Manager
Manager of Sourcing & Process Engineering Vice President, Sustainable Operations
Senior Quality Manager Vice President, Engineering
Director, Overseas Operations Executive Director, Operations
Manager, Supply Management
Manager, New Plants Instrumentation & Control 
Systems
Supply Council Manager Program Manager, Legacy Systems & Upgrades
Director, System Program Management & 
Customer Support H President / CEO 1 48mins
Manager, Aftermarket Business Development I President / CEO 1 1hr 44mins
Purchasing Manager Associate Director of Engineering
Procurement Analyst Director, Global Procurement
Vice President, Supply Chains K Executive Director, Quality Assurance 1 1hr 30mins
Director, Supply Chain Management Vice President, Outside Sales
Manager, Supply Chain Operations Manager
Commodity Manager Customer Engagement Lead
2
L 3
A
B
E
C
D
F
J
G
1hr 14mins
3
2
2
1hr 16mins
1hr 14mins
1hr 32mins
2hrs 12mins
1hr 50mins
1hr
1hr 10mins
1hr
4
3
4
4
 102 
 
A formal case study worksheet (See Appendix B) was used and each interview was 
recorded, transcribed and coded for evaluation.  
An iterative, multi-phase collect-analyze-compare process was applied for the 
firm-level interviews and for each specific insourcing case.  Binder and Edwards (2010) 
state that in using this approach, “the researcher moves back and forth between data 
collection, coding and interpretation in an iterative manner (analytic induction) until 
theoretical saturation is achieved (newly analyzed data do not prompt further changes to 
the concepts) which leads to a tightly woven theory that emerges from and is ‘grounded’ 
in the data.”  This approach, coupled with the use of “why” and “how” questions 
“…provide(d) depth and richness for constructing knowledge and building theories of 
contemporary and little known phenomena” (Binder and Edwards, 2010).   
Strauss and Corbin (1998) provide a data and information coding methodology 
which allowed the researcher to systematically evaluate the information gathered through 
the interview process.  The coding methodology applied to this research was: 
 Stage 1: Development of key template categories based on research objectives. 
 Stage 2: Codification and analysis of interviews. 
 Stage 3: Clustering of codes into coherent categories. 
 Stage 4. Development of coding master table (axial and selective coding). 
 Stage 5. Formation of propositions.  (See Section 5.9)   
 
Binder and Edwards (2010) suggest that this is not to be a linear approach from 
Stage 1 to 5, therefore the research approach involved iterations within and between 
stages as the researchers became more familiar with the data.  Figure 13 below illustrates 
the high-level approach applied during the data collection and analysis process.  It 
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highlights the major steps of the approach which were required in order to achieve a high 
degree of research reliability (i.e., repeatability) (Yin, 1989).   
Information and data gathered through the interview and case study approach was 
synthesized into case reports which were made available to the research participants for 
content validation.  The case reports were then used as substantive and supporting 
content, along with other literature and information collected, to formally structure the 
results in tables which supported further analysis through pattern matching.  This 
approach ensured reliability of the research approach and enables future expansion of the 
number of cases (and inclusion of other industries).  
 
Figure 13 – Research Data Collection and Analysis Approach 
 
 
 
5.6  Analysis and Results:  Firm-level Interviews 
 
Participants were asked to select a value, 1-5 [1 = lowest, 5 = highest] which best 
reflects the level of influence the specific factor has on firm-level outsourcing-to-
insourcing decisions.  We present the results of the firm-level question, “How do the 
following factors influence an insourcing decision?” in summary format in Table 11 
 
 
Conduct 
Pre-interview 
Survey
Select Cases
Conduct  
Case Study 
Interview
Analyze and 
Code DataCase 1
Conduct 
Pre-interview 
Survey
Conduct  
Case Study 
Interview
Analyze and 
Code DataCase 2
Conduct 
Pre-interview 
Survey
Conduct  
Case Study 
Interview
Analyze and 
Code DataCase (n)
Write 
Cross-case 
Report
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below.  For purposes of meaningful examination, we have sorted the ordinal data for each 
factor by total score value, highest to lowest.  There is no implied or inferred quantitative 
analysis being conducted here.  In other words, there is no quantifiable difference 
between a selection of ‘5’ or ‘4’ other than the justification provided by the research 
participants, just as there is no quantifiable difference between ‘41’ and ‘42’.  As this is 
not a quantitative analysis of the factor scores, our primary objective is to use ‘power 
quotes’ (Pratt, 2009) identified in the coded transcripts to describe the rationale behind 
the participant’s response selection.  Factor scores, response rationale and additional 
information provided by the firms were triangulated then examined for each firm (i.e., 
within case analysis) and across firms and against other cases (i.e., cross case analysis).   
Table 11 – Interview Question #4, Firm-level Summary Results 
 
 
  
5.6.1  Discussion of Firm-level Interview Results 
 In this section we discuss Table 11 from an overarching firm-level perspective.  
That is, we examine the information in Table 11 from the viewpoint of the firm’s senior 
A B C D E F G H I J K L
Cost Reduction 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 55
Performance Consequences 5 4 4 4 3 5 3 4 5 5 5 4 51
Improve Productivity 4 5 2 4 4 3 4 5 5 5 2 4 47
Need for Expertise 5 3 3 4 3 5 4 4 4 3 4 5 47
Quality 4 3 4 4 4 5 1 3 5 4 5 5 47
Focus on Core Competencies 4 3 5 4 4 5 3 4 3 2 2 3 42
Service Improvement 3 1 4 3 4 5 2 3 5 3 4 5 42
Supplier Market Power 5 1 2 4 3 4 2 4 5 4 5 3 42
Technical Advances 5 1 4 3 4 5 3 4 4 1 3 5 42
Global Supply Chain Risks 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 5 4 41
Outsourcing Risks 5 3 4 1 4 5 3 2 3 1 4 4 39
Just-in-Time Complexities 3 2 3 1 3 5 3 1 5 2 4 5 37
Supply Chain Infrastructure Investment 2 3 3 2 4 4 1 3 4 4 3 4 37
Regulatory Change 5 5 2 1 4 4 4 1 4 1 4 1 36
Rapid Growth 4 4 2 1 3 4 1 4 5 1 4 2 35
Leverage Supply Chain Management 3 3 2 5 3 2 2 2 4 2 3 1 32
Supply Chain Integration 3 1 3 4 3 3 1 1 4 4 3 2 32
Contract Strategy 4 5 1 3 2 3 1 1 5 2 2 1 30
Human Resources 3 2 2 4 5 1 2 4 4 1 1 1 30
Proprietary Systems Profitability 5 2 3 1 2 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 29
Globalization of Business 2 4 3 5 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 26
Integration of Information Technologies 3 1 1 1 4 1 3 1 5 1 1 3 25
Upgrade Information Technology 4 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 22
Organization - Senior Leader Perspective
Influential Factor Total
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executives and managers, with the intent of recognizing patterns of similarity as well as 
identification of dissimilar responses across firms.  It is through this pattern recognition 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) that we are able to begin developing a deeper 
understanding of the importance firms may place on any single influential factor.  Again, 
the value selected to represent the influential importance of a factor to the firm is just the 
beginning.  We are ultimately interested in developing an understanding of the ‘why’ 
behind the selection.  This requires developing a linkage between the values in Table 11 
and the coded transcripts.  The coded transcripts allow us to reference specific discussion 
points or comments made by senior executives and managers that provide substantiation 
of the value selection.  Together, the value selected and supporting comments provide an 
invaluable basis for proposition development, theory evaluation and future research 
concerning firm-level outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decisions. 
 
 
 First Pass Pattern Recognition 
In looking at the patterns represented in Table 11 above, our first pass 
examination identifies a high degree of importance placed on the following factors by the 
firms as indicated by the consistency of the dark box pattern for the influential factors: 
 
 -Cost Reduction 
 -Performance Consequences 
 -Improve Productivity 
 -Need for Expertise 
 -Quality 
 
For example, senior executives and managers have identified cost reduction has 
having the highest degree of influence on the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing 
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relocation decision.  Seven of twelve firms selected the value ‘5’ and the remaining five 
firms selected the value of ‘4’ to represent the level of influence cost reduction has on 
any decision to insource manufacturing workload.  We also recognize a strong degree of 
similarity for the upgrade information technology factor at the bottom of the table.  For 
this factor, nine of twelve firms selected the values ‘1’ or ‘2’ to represent a very low 
degree of influential significance related to the outsourcing-to-insourcing decision.   
 
As important as it is to identify and understand similarities, the results associated 
with those factors with high degrees of dissimilarity also provide insight into the complex 
outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation issues.  For example, the outsourcing 
risks factor is representative of those factors where there appears to be a high degree of 
dissimilarity across firms.  Here we see two firms selected the value ‘5’ to identify a very 
high degree of influence while on the other end of the value scale two firms selected the 
value ‘1’.  Coded transcripts allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the true meaning 
of the responses in examining similarities and dissimilarities of selected values. 
Our initial review of the factor-specific values and coded transcripts revealed 
there may be a logical grouping of the influential factors into tactical, strategic and 
enabling influences.  The following descriptions are provided for each grouping: 
Tactical Influences: factors closely linked to firm-level achievement of 
near-term customer service, financial management, production, and 
resource utilization goals. 
Strategic Influences: factors for which the firm’s managers develop and 
position resources in response to anticipated mid-term changes in internal 
or external conditions. 
Enabling Influences: factors which support achievement of the firm’s 
long-term intra- or inter-firm objectives. 
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We have structured Figure 14 below to reflect this organization and provide 
support for this arrangement based on respondent’s selection of influential value and 
statements made by interview participants.  It appears the tactical influences to be the 
most influential in the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision.  We 
provide detailed analysis of the firm-level values and supporting comments for each of 
the five factors aligned to this group.  This approach allowed us to begin developing and 
rationalizing a response to our first research question: 
 
What are the primary influential factors associated with a firm’s outsourcing-to-
insourcing manufacturing relocation decision? 
   
 
Summary analysis is provided for the 10 strategic influences and 8 enabling 
influences at the group level.  This approach allowed us to examine example factor-
specific value inconsistencies and provide examples from the coded transcripts which 
support the grouping assignment and stated results.    
 
 
Figure 14 – Tactical, Strategic and Enabling Influences 
0
10
20
30
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60
Total Factor Score
Tactical Influences Strategic Influences Enabling Influences
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Tactical Influences 
As defined above, tactical influences are those factors closely linked to firm-level 
achievement of near-term customer service, financial management, production, and 
resource utilization goals.  Examination of the firm-level values in Table 11 and the 
coded transcripts allowed us to identify five factors firm selected as having the most 
influence on the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision.  Those five 
factors are Cost Reduction, Performance Consequences, Improve Productivity, Need for 
Expertise, and Quality.  Results for of each of these factors, including supporting 
evidence from the coded transcripts is provide below. 
Cost Reduction-100% of the firms (12/12 firms; 30 interviewees) identified this 
factor as having the highest influence on the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing 
relocation decision.  As with outsourcing, it appears cost reduction is the most significant 
reason why firms elect to insource manufacturing or manufacturing support services.  
While there is no apparent value or pattern dissimilarity across firms (i.e., all firms 
selected a value ‘4’ or ‘5’), the basis of value selection does vary.  Firms identified cost 
reductions related to labor, transportation, distribution, pipeline inventory and broader 
allocation of overhead costs as examples. One senior manager participant provided the 
following statement which is indicative of many firms insourcing manufacturing 
workload from offshore outsource suppliers:  
 
…looking at how much it's costing us.  It used to cost us $1,400 for a container to 
ship it over here and that was when we were outsourcing this product to China.  
Today it's $4,500 a container and we've eroded our margin based on the 
transportation cost. It's a fourfold increase in the cost of our product moving 
across the ocean. 
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Others identified costs reduction opportunities through development of non-core 
competency areas to extend machine and capacity utilization as a mechanism to reduce 
direct and indirect costs.  The statements below are examples representative of statements 
made by several large, medium and small manufacturers: 
 
…there will be times that we decide we’re going to load up something in order to 
get the overhead—we’ve done this in our career, brought parts back in to get our 
overhead rate down. 
 
…we were sending spindles out, most of the C&C machines have a spindle that 
needs to be rebuilt once a year, once every two years, and to get those rebuilt 
people were charging $10-, $15-, $20,000 dollars.  We put a couple of guys on it 
and they figured out how to do it for about half the costs.  So we end up getting 
into that business just to keep the price reasonable.  
 
For all firms, insourcing is seen as a primary mechanism for reducing, containing 
and controlling manufacturing related direct and indirect costs.  Senior executives and 
managers consistently selected cost reduction as the most influential factor in the 
outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision.  
 Performance Consequences-83% of firms (10/12 firms; 26 interviewees) selected 
a value of ‘4’ or ‘5’ to describe the influence performance consequences has on the 
outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision.  Two firms (4 interviewees) 
selected a value of ‘3’.  To many firms selecting a value of ‘4’ or ‘5’, performance 
consequences range from “…we began to develop a lack of confidence that the supplier 
would be able to meet our production schedule which could produce delays or stoppages 
of our lines” to “…the supplier no longer added value to the component”. 
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There were examples where firms outsourced initial manufacturing of 
components in order to stabilize the production process.  Once the supplier had stabilized 
the process and the component’s reliability and quality were consistently meeting the 
firm’s objectives, the component was insourced and integrated into the firm’s 
manufacturing environment.  This indicates that outsourcing served to improve 
manufacturing, production and component performance.  However, once the desired 
performance characteristics were achieved, the manufacturing relocation decision was 
made to insource the component—“…but once we understood the final product and the 
qualification of it, we [determined] we can do this process as well inside.” 
Two examples were given where firms had worked to develop specific 
manufacturing processes with suppliers to produce components that were to be integrated 
into final assemblies.  Both firms had very similar experiences following initial testing 
and acceptance of the supplier’s component.  In both cases, the supplier changed 
processes without the firm’s knowledge and the firm was no longer able to fully integrate 
the component into the end item.  The production was insourced after the firms faced 
increasing costs, significant delays, inability to meet customer delivery schedules.  These 
examples are best summarized by a statement from an account executive, “…why should 
we continue to pay them to make the same mistakes we could have made.  We got our 
engineers involved to get it [production] stable.  Don’t redesign so you can send it out 
again.”  In recognizing the performance consequences and responding, the firms were 
able to regain control of the production process and, in-turn, meet their production 
schedules. 
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As a final example associated with the performance consequences factor, a firm 
described a scenario where the firm’s level of business with the supplier over time 
represented a smaller portion of the supplier’s overall revenue.  As a result, the supplier’s 
delivery performance became unacceptable.  The supplier’s delays began to impact the 
firm’s relationship with downstream customers and the firm made the decision to develop 
in-house capabilities in parallel with the supplier’s as a near-term solution. Supporting 
this, the senior manager stated, “…the size of the change, [determines] whether we’ll do 
it all at once and/or go in phases.”  Eventually, the firm fully established the internal 
capability and completely insourced their workload from the supplier.   
For the two firms identifying this factor with a value of ‘3’, neither had 
experienced performance consequences associated with their outsourced workload.  Each 
firm agreed that it is a factor that should be considered during any evaluation of 
outsourcing-to-insourcing opportunities in the event that any performance consequences 
could not be managed through market-driven competition where switching costs are low.   
Improve Productivity-75% of firms (9/12 firms; 20 interviewees) identified 
improve productivity as having significant influence on their outsourcing-to-insourcing 
manufacturing relocation decisions as represented by their selection of value ‘4’ or ‘5’.  
Of the remaining three firms, one firm selected the influential value ‘3’ and two selected 
the value ‘2’ to describe the level of influence improve productivity has on the 
manufacturing relocation decision. 
Characteristics of this factor from the outsourcing literature include, but are not 
limited to, faster deliveries, reduced cycle times or expansion of services.  For several of 
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the firms who identified improve productivity as a highly influential factor concerning 
insourcing, their rationale is best exemplified by a senior executive’s position that, 
“…there is value in [having it] in-house because your responsiveness of resources that 
you can control is for your own production.  There’s inherent value to wrap your hands 
around that and be able to control destiny whereas if you’re ordering something from an 
outside supplier and you’re [only] 1/100th of their business it is hard to get their 
attention.”  The executive was referring to the ability of the supplier to prioritize and 
respond to changes in demand associated with the firm’s production schedule.  The 
inability (or lack of willingness) of the supplier to respond can significantly increase 
cycle times.  In this example, insourcing the production of the sub-component was seen 
as a mechanism to mitigate changes in demand-driven production. 
  For smaller firms, there is a constant awareness of productivity measures as 
evidenced by one executives comment, “…we walk and talk and breathe that [improved 
productivity] every day.”  The executive was conveying that any supplier-driven delays 
(i.e., product quality or delivery) can have a significant impact on smaller firms who may 
not have the ability to mitigate productivity impacts.  Larger firms, on the other hand, 
may have the in-house resources to absorb delays created by the outsourced provider, 
particularly when the outsourced supplier is producing components using the firm’s 
engineering and design package.   
As one executive identified, if there are continued problems with the supplier 
“…we can readily go into our machine shop, take our existing design and make [machine 
set up] modifications within a day or so.  Our time to market and to research is a lot faster 
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than what we have outsourced.”  Although this type of insourcing may not be 
economically feasible, even for large firms, it is apparent through the interviews that 
productivity and customer responsiveness are very important in highly competitive 
markets.  In order for firms to insource workload in an attempt to improve productivity, it 
is most likely that they would seek “…to prove it out on the cost side and [determine if] it 
made the business case.” 
Ten interviewees representing three firms identified values of ‘3’ and ‘2’ to 
describe the influence of improve productivity on outsourcing-to-insourcing decisions.  
These values may be best described by a senior manager who suggested that there are 
advantages to outsourcing but those advantages can be quickly eroded “when we’re 
somewhat limited in how we control that supplier.  If he runs in to problems, if he doesn’t 
tell us right away and tries to work it, we may be hit with a surprise in a few 
weeks…we’re going to be out of parts.”  We determined from these types of comments 
that the firms were satisfied as long as they had visibility into the supplier’s processes. 
Need for Expertise-66% of firms (8/12 firms; 19 interviewees) either assigned a 
value of ‘4’ or ‘5’ to this factor’s influence while the remaining three firms (11 
interviewees) identified the value of ‘3’.  The outsourcing literature suggests that firms 
may derive value through the use of the supplier’s skills and expertise.  However, we 
identified specific examples where firms elected to insource manufacturing and 
manufacturing support services in order to better utilize the expertise of their employees. 
This included, in some cases, addition of new personnel with specialized skills.  These 
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personnel were either very experienced technicians or were highly qualified professional 
employees with advanced certifications in areas such as engineering or quality. 
One senior manager commented “…a lot of companies are looking at Detroit 
because there’s an abundance of engineers that have lost jobs because of outsourcing.”  
His firm was in the process of re-evaluating their portfolio of outsourced manufacturing 
and manufacturing support services to determine, based on the availability of qualified 
engineers, what workload could be brought in-house. 
In another example, one executive commented that the technical complexities of 
manufacturing equipment now requires firms to examine the qualifications of their 
existing workforce to ensure the firm has the right skills and expertise needed for growth.  
This firm acquired a very dynamic, state-of-the-art multi-axis milling machine after 
conducting exhaustive lean and six sigma process improvement events.  As a result of 
acquiring the new machine, the firm found that the current employees lacked the 
expertise to use the full capability of the machine.  After hiring several new production 
engineers who had the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities, the firm insourced all 
multi-axis milling work it had outsourced over the last several years.  They were able to 
develop multi-axis milling as a core competency which significantly added to their 
internal production capabilities and improved the firm’s value to its customer base. 
One interesting comment was provided by a firm who has developed extensive 
outsourcing relationships with manufacturers in China.  The manager suggested that 
manufacturing technologies are advancing at such a rate that their firm recently began 
searching for new hires with specialized software experience.  The firm was acquiring 
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new manufacturing equipment that requires software coding skills and these new 
employees were going to be the “…manufacturing workforce of the future”.  The firm’s 
new manufacturing strategy will have significantly fewer employees yet will enable the 
firm to insource workload from China that will improve its overhead cost position. 
The firms identifying this factor with a value of ‘3’ were primarily focused on 
better using the skills and expertise of their existing workforce.  Some did comment that 
as the global economic environment changes (i.e., access to cheap labor) their firms may 
begin to look at opportunities to invest in new manufacturing processes and equipment.  
However, their current outsourcing relationships allowed them to access the skills and 
expertise needed to meet production and customer demands. 
  Quality-75% of firms (9/12 firms; 24 interviewees) considered the influential 
value of quality as significantly important in their evaluation of outsourced 
manufacturing as evidenced by their selection of the value ‘4’ or ‘5’.  Two firms selected 
the value ‘3’ and one firm selected the value ‘1’.  Expected quality improvements, 
especially associated with non-core competency areas, are often associated with 
outsourcing.  Many of the research participants identified erosion of product or process 
quality as one of their top reasons or drivers for electing to insource workload. 
One senior manager summarized the importance of quality this way, “quality is 
very critical and important.  If you don’t have the right quality coming from your 
supplier, I don’t think it’s a knee-jerk reaction to say, ‘well, we’ve got to bring it in 
because they can’t do it’.”  Other managers suggest that “you get what you pay for” and 
although labor-related costs have allowed firms to outsource to overseas manufacturers, 
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customers are looking for reliability and quality in the products they purchase.  This point 
is made by one executive who stated, “what good does it do for us to save a dollar when 
you don’t sell something” because the level of quality just isn’t there. 
Other firms identified design and conformance quality issues as being significant 
drivers for insourcing workload from their suppliers.  Examples provided included 
discussion of suppliers who were facing financial difficulties which lead to an erosion of 
product quality most likely attributed to relaxed process standards.  One firm went to 
great lengths to work with their supplier to improve the quality of a subassembly which 
was to be integrated into a final assembly.  After months of repeated issues, the firm re-
aligned internal capabilities to bring the work in-house, stating, “…I won’t put anything 
in my product that’s not the best to me, we pride ourselves on the level of quality that we 
have.” 
There are also firms who have product liability issues where quality standards 
must be achieved.  For example, a large manufacture who had outsourced a significant 
amount of work to an overseas manufacturer found repeated quality issues to be huge 
cost issues.  Although the outsource manufacturer was responsible for quality, the firm 
was responsible for cost associated with customer returns and, in-turn, potential loss of 
market share attributable to quality related product re-calls. This point is summarized by 
the following comment made by the senior quality engineer: 
…if there was an issue with the design or quality of their manufacturing we would 
be able to go back to them at some level to recoup costs that we incur for that if 
we were to have a recall or something like that. The problem is that the face of it, 
when the customer, the retailer has that on their shelf, they aren't sending it back 
to the contract manufacturer, it comes back through us. 
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The firm identifying quality with a value of ‘1’ commented that their approach to 
addressing quality issues is to work with the supplier.  If the supplier’s quality does not 
improve to acceptable standards, the firm first looks for other suppliers who have the 
required design or manufacturing capability.  For this firm, quality issues alone would not 
be a primary driver for insourcing.  Other factors such as cost reduction or opportunities 
to improve productivity would also need to be evaluated.  
Strategic Influences 
 As defined above, we identified factors for which the firm’s managers develop 
and position resources in response to anticipated mid-term changes in internal or external 
conditions as strategic influences.  There may be some degree of overlap between factors 
identified as tactical and those identified as strategic.  However, the value selection and 
views expressed by interview participants support the organization of the 10 influential 
factors called out below into the category of strategic influences: 
1) Focus on Core Competencies; 2) Service Improvement; 3) Supplier Market 
Power; 4) Technical Advances; 5) Global Supply Chain Risks; 6) Outsourcing 
Risks; 7) Just-in-Time Complexities; 8) Supply Chain Infrastructure Investment; 
9) Regulatory Change; and 10) Rapid Growth 
 This alignment is supported by the views expressed by senior executives, 
managers and personnel within the firm familiar with the firm’s strategic views 
concerning the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation shift.  For example, in 
discussing the focus on core competencies factor, participants commented that the reason 
for outsourcing manufacturing functions to begin with was that the function was not a 
core competency.  Most firms agreed that their need to adapt to changes in the global 
market may force them to re-evaluate existing core competencies against internal firm 
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changes.  Examples provided of these changes include leadership turnover, new visions 
for expanding current market sales, and creation of new product lines.   
 This same type of rationalization appears in the interview transcripts for the other 
influential factors.  For example, responding to increases in supplier market power, firms 
suggested they would first evaluate efforts to work with other suppliers before making an 
insourcing decision.  However, this approach was not successful for one firm.  The firm 
ultimately identified an internal ability to manufacture subcomponents in-house thereby 
reducing the supplier’s power position.  One executive with a very large manufacturing 
firm summarized this point,  
…once it gets around the market place that I’m going to pull work out of a 
supplier and we have the capability to do it in-house we’re able to use that as 
leverage.  We tell other suppliers that ‘hey, you need to help us improve on costs, 
otherwise we’re going to pull this thing in’.   
This type of approach may not support achievement of near-term objectives (i.e., 
tactical influences), but is more representative of a firm’s ability to evaluate influential 
factors and make decisions that may take time to implement.  Insourcing decisions 
associated with outsourcing risks may be best summarized by the following senior 
executive’s statement, “…people don’t understand that moving stuff [away from the 
supplier], especially complex business, is hard and risky.”  In other words, if it is not a 
core competency, firms may be reluctant to insource functions unless the outsourcing risk 
has the potential to negatively impact the firm’s business objectives.  This may be why 
6/12 firms selected a value of ‘4’ or ‘5’ to represent the influence of outsourcing risks on 
the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision.   
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  Enabling Influences 
 Based on the firm-level interviews, we defined this category of factors as those 
factors which support achievement of the firm’s long-term intra- or inter-firm objectives.  
While the outsourcing literature suggests these factors have some degree of influence on 
outsourcing decisions our results suggests firms view these factors as having very little, if 
any, influence on the insourcing decision.  This is most likely due to the position 
expressed by several firms that insourcing decisions are normally executed in response to 
an externally-driven issue which triggers the insourcing event.  The influential factors 
considered to be enablers of the insourcing decision are better aligned with achievement 
or recognition of long-term objectives.  We provide supporting examples below, taken 
from the coded transcripts, which support this position. 
   Human Resources—for many firms, the ability to hire, train and fully utilize 
their internal resources does appear to moderately influence firm-level manufacturing 
relocation decisions; however, it has little influence on the near-term decision process.  
For example, one executive stated that the question asked during the evaluation of 
relocation opportunities is, “how long will it take for me to train that workforce in order 
to bring that workload in?”  This question suggests that if the workload cannot be 
accomplished with the existing workforce, the long-term training required in order to 
develop the requisite expertise may offset any other near-term insourcing advantages. 
 A senior manager recalled discussions where insourcing workload from the 
outsouring supplier would have made economic sense in terms of improving fixed costs 
allocation.  However, this near-term economic advantage was overshadowed by 
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requirements to cross-train employees (develop additional niche skills) to support the 
insourced workload.  Without any long-term guarantee the re-trained employee(s) would 
remain with the firm, any decision to insource the workload presented unnecessary risks.    
An executive faced with a similar scenario commented, “there’s nothing to retain 
employees.  We realized that we were training people to go to work for someone else.”  
We concluded that most firms would not make an insourcing decision if the decision 
required the firm make investments in specialized training for employees, particularly if 
there were no guarantees of retaining the re-trained employee(s). 
Firm-level perspectives and comments concerning the remaining influential 
factors aligned with the Enabling Influences category clearly suggested that these factors 
would not significantly influence a near-term or mid-term manufacturing relocation 
decision.  For example, senior executives and managers revealed that the factors leverage 
supply chain management, supply chain integration, and integration of information 
technologies would have more influence on an insourcing decision if the firm was 
focused on increasing intra-firm performance between disparate organizations. 
 Many firms expressed concern with proprietary systems profitability and 
commented that there are increasing pressures to protect intellectual property, e.g., 
engineering designs.  Firms were aware that outsourcing, particularly overseas 
outsourcing, presents firms with unique challenges in this area.  However, most firms 
suggested that prior to considering insourcing the function they would first look to re-
source the function (i.e., nearshore or reshore) from an overseas location.          
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5.7  Analysis and Results: Specific Insourcing Cases 
Firms provided specific insourcing case examples which were discussed during 
the interviews with the firm’s senior executives, managers and other personnel familiar 
with the specific insourcing case.  A formal case study worksheet and interview guide 
were provided to the participants in advance of the interview then discussed in detail 
during the interview.  Each interview was digitally recorded and professionally 
transcribed.  The transcripts were then coded to support further analysis of the individual 
cases.  Table 12 below captures the content of the case study worksheet.  The table 
includes descriptive details of each specific insourcing case.  Our focus was to identify 
the top three factors having the most influence on the specific insourcing decision and 
attempt to identify patterns of influence across and between the cases (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). 
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Table 12 – Specific Case Summaries 
 
 
 5.7.1  Discussion of Case Study Results 
 As indicated by the cases identified in Table 12 above, nine out of fourteen cases 
identified cost reduction or other financial improvements as having the most influence on 
the insourcing decision.  Seven out of fourteen cases included quality or reliability 
measures as having the most influence.  As seen in Table 13 below, factors categorized as 
Tactical Influences appeared 33 times in the listing of the top three justifications for the 
insourcing decision, Strategic Influences appeared 9 times.  None of the cases identified 
Canada Mexico Europe Asia
  1. reduce cost                                                                                         
  2. technical advances (capital equipment)   
  3. improve quality            
  1. reduce cost                                                                                                                  
  2. production performance consequences    
  3. improve productivity      
  1. reduce cost                                                                      
  2. improve quality      
  3. production performance consequences
  1. reduce cost                                                                                  
  2. supplier market power     
  3. improve delivery performance
  3. technical advances (capital equipment) 
  2. need for expertise      
  1. focus on core competency                                                                       
  1. improve delivery performance                                                                                                   
  2. just-in-time complexities      
  3. improve quality     
  1. improve delivery performance                                                                                                          
  2. reduce cost     
  3. leverage in-house capability 
  1. supplier market power                                                                                                                             
  2. production performance consequences 
  3. reduce cost      
  1. technical advances (product maturity)                                                                                              
  2. improve productivity    
  3. leverage in-house capability      
  1. loss of profit in value chain                                                                                                                                       
  2. improve quality 
  3. leverage in-house capability 
  2. improve reliability       
  3. production performance consequences
  1. improve productivity                                                                              
  1. reduce cost                                                                                                                                                                                              
  2. focus on core competency 
  3. improve quality      
  1. reduce cost                                                                                            
  2. improve quality       
  3. improve delivery performance
  1. production performance consequences                                                                
  2. outsourcing risks 
  3. improve delivery performance
Insourcing Decision Justification
A
5-10 yrs > 10 yrs Locally                    (<90 mi.) Regionally
Outside Region 
(within U.S.)
Outside U.S.
Case Description Outsourced Duration
Final 
Product
Sub-
assembly Component Service < 1 yr 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs
x
Firm
B x
x x
Outsourced Provider's Location
C x
x x
xD x x
x xE(1) x
x x
x x x
F(1) x
E(2)
F(2) x
x x
G x
x x
H x
x x
x
I(1) x
x
I(2) x
x x
J x
x
x x
x
K x
x
x
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any of the Enabling Influences as being significant in the specific outsourcing-to-
insourcing manufacturing relocation decision.   
Table 13 – Examination of Influences 
 
  
 The results from the specific cases align with the firm-level perspectives gathered 
through the interviews.  This further supports our categorization of the 23 influential 
factors into Tactical, Strategic and Enabling influences.  The interviews with senior 
executives and managers, and the cases examined suggest that insourcing decisions are 
predominantly made in order to achieve a firm’s near-term objectives.  These near-term 
objectives have been identified as 1) decrease costs, 2) mitigate performance 
consequences, 3) improve productivity, 4) address intra-firm needs for expertise, and     
5) improve quality.    
 
5.8  Conclusions 
Our research results fill a known gap in the operations and supply chain 
management literature concerning the primary factors influencing the outsourcing-to-
insourcing manufacturing relocation shift.  Our contributions to the literature include a 
survey of the outsourcing literature which identified 23 factors considered to influence 
outsourcing decisions.  We examined each of these 23 factors and identified the 5 most 
significant influences on the outsourcing-to-insourcing relocation decision.   
Insourcing Justification
#1 Influence
#2 Influence
#3 Influence 1
Enabling
0
0
0
Influential Grouping
Tactical Strategic
11
9
13
3
5
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The results from the interviews were then evaluated against 14 manufacturing 
insourcing cases to determine if firm-level perspectives of factor influence were the same 
as those identified for the specific insourcing cases.  Our results indicate that firm-level 
perspectives of factor influence aligned with case-specific influential factors.  These 
results support the organization of outsourcing-to-insourcing influential factors into the 
categories of Tactical, Strategic and Enabling Influences.  Firm-level and case-specific 
results indicate that Tactical Influences have the most significant influence on the 
insourcing decision.      
Senior executives, managers and personnel within the firm familiar with the 
specific insourcing case identified 5 out of 23 factors has having the most significant 
level of influence on a firm’s decision to insource manufacturing workload.  The results 
indicate that firms make insourcing decisions to 1) decrease costs, 2) mitigate 
performance consequences, 3) improve productivity, 4) address intra-firm needs for 
expertise, and 4) improve quality.  Secondary influences on the insourcing decision 
include 10 influential factors classified as Strategic Influences. 
Our results indicate that primary reasons for outsourcing and insourcing are the 
same.  Firms make sourcing decisions which best position the firm to minimize cost, 
improve quality, and increase productivity and performance.  The interviews with senior 
executives and managers suggest that most insourcing decisions are in response to an 
external trigger event (e.g., erosion of quality or cost increases).  We did, however, 
identify examples where firms made insourcing decisions in response to changes in the 
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internal environment.  These examples included improved processes (i.e., through lean, 
six sigma) or acquisition of machinery which increased the firm’s production capacity.   
Key differences between outsourcing and insourcing appear to be largely 
associated with those factors classified as Enabling Influences.  Unlike outsourcing, firms 
did not consider the Enabling Influences to be significant in the manufacturing relocation 
decision.  This is most likely due to the long-term focus implied by these factors.  
 
The themes of TCE would suggest that firms facing difficulties in the market (i.e., 
cost increases) should rely on the governance mechanisms internal to the firm to reduce 
transaction costs.  Our results indicate that firms will insource manufacturing functions to 
support achievement of near-term financial objectives.  Consistent with the themes of 
RBV, our results indicate that firms seek to work with suppliers to decrease costs and 
improve quality to sustain competitive advantage before making an insourcing decision. 
The results of the interviews and case study analysis indicate that the themes of TCE and 
RBV align with and support our identification and classification of the primary influential 
factors.  The factors classified as tactical influences are consistent with the themes of 
TCE and RBV, and have the most influence on a firm’s outsourcing-to-insourcing 
manufacturing relocation decision.  
 
 
5.9  Managerial Implications and Propositions 
 Firms evaluating opportunities to reduce costs, improve quality, and increase 
performance or productivity measures should carefully evaluate their outsourced 
manufacturing portfolio.  Consideration should be given to changes in the firm’s needs 
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for new expertise or skills associated with the advancement of manufacturing 
technologies.  Where outsourcing decisions were made to allow the firm to focus on core 
competencies, these decisions should be evaluated against updated internal objectives and 
any changes which may have occurred in the external environment.  Enabling influential 
factors should also be examined to identify changes which may have occurred.  Areas 
which warrant careful consideration include changes in regulatory policy, proprietary 
system profitability or opportunities to modify existing supplier contracts. 
 The results of the interviews and case studies led to the development of the 
following research propositions: 
 5.9.1  Proposition One: The tactical influences of cost reduction, performance 
consequences, improve productivity, need for expertise and quality are very similar 
sources of influence for both outsourcing and insourcing of manufacturing functions. 
Tactical influential factors appear to support the firm’s desire to implement 
manufacturing sourcing strategies which best position the firm to achieve near-term 
customer service, financial management, production, and resource utilization goals.   
  
5.9.2  Proposition Two: The strategic influences are most often associated with 
the firm’s ability to develop and position resources in response to anticipated changes in 
internal or external conditions.   
Strategic influences—Focus on Core Competencies, Service Improvement, 
Supplier Market Power, Technical Advances, Global Supply Chain Risks, Outsourcing 
Risks, Just-in-Time Complexities, Supply Chain Infrastructure Investment, Regulatory 
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Change, Rapid Growth—appear to have moderate influence on the outcomes of the 
firm’s outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decisions.  
 
5.9.3  Proposition Three: The Enabling influences have very have little influence 
on the outcomes of the firm’s outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation 
decision. 
 Influential factors which support achievement of the firm’s long-term intra- and 
inter-firm objectives were found to require commitment of the firm’s resources beyond 
any immediate planning horizon.  Many interview participants described the insourcing 
decision to be in response to a need to improve near-term outcomes and did not believe 
enabling influences could affectively achieve the desired outcome.   
 
5.10 Research Limitations and Future Direction 
We examined the relative influence of 23 factors identified in the operations and 
supply chain management outsourcing literature to determine which, if any, of these same 
factors influence outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decisions.  Our 
research results may not be generalizable across and between industries in that we 
worked with only 12 firms in the manufacturing and manufacturing support services 
sectors of the U.S. economy to complete our interviews and case study examinations.  A 
large-scale evaluation should be completed which evaluates the 23 influential factors 
multiple firms within the same North American Industry Classification (NAIC).  
Consideration should be given to the effects of other factors such as the firm’s primary 
manufacturing focus (e.g., final products, subassemblies, or components), firm financial 
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size, duration of the outsourced manufacturing strategy, and the outsourced provider’s 
location.   
We organized the 23 influential factors into tactical, strategic and enabling 
categories based on the results 30 interviews with senior executives and managers.  We 
are not aware of any literature which contains a prioritization of these influential factors.  
A large-scale survey, including firms outside the U.S., may provide a deeper 
understanding of the 23 factors.  This prioritization research should be conducted for 
manufacturing and manufacturing support services as well as other industries.   
There may also be advantages gained through research conducted with suppliers 
of outsourced manufacturing, production and support services.  Our research was 
completed from the buyer’s perspective and the results may not be generalizable in the 
buyer-supplier dyadic framework.  Gaining the perspective of suppliers may add to the 
broader understanding of the outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation shift. 
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6.0  Research Summary  
 
6.1  Major Research Findings 
 In the sections that follow, the primary findings captured in Chapters 3-5 are 
discussed.  The findings are presented in summary format.  The individual chapter should 
be referenced for additional detail or supporting information.   
  
6.1.1  Chapter 3, Academic Paper #1 – Contract Duration: A Barrier or 
Bridge to Supplier-side Innovative Investment in Public/Private Partnerships 
 In this chapter, 10 propositions relating to contract duration and supplier-side 
innovative investment were evaluated.  Findings for each proposition are presented 
below. 
Proposition 1a. Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s partnership motive is an 
important influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
 Finding:  Not Supported 
 
Proposition 1b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s partnership motive is an 
important influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
Finding.  Not Supported 
  
These findings suggest buyers and suppliers do not consider the ‘motive’ of the 
potential relationship participant as a significant influential factor contributing to an 
overall risk position. 
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Proposition 2a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s relationship trust is an 
important influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
Finding.  Partially Supported 
 
Proposition 2b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s relationship trust is an 
important influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
Finding.  Partially Supported 
   
The buyer’s perception of relationship trust is developed post contract award and 
is linked to supplier performance.  Suppliers view relationship trust as an informal 
mechanism needed when addressing issues not specifically called out in the formal 
contract. 
 
Proposition 3a.  Buyer’s perception of the supplier’s capability to achieve 
contracted product or service performance objectives is an important influential 
factor in determining the buyer-side risk position. 
Finding.  Supported 
 
Proposition 3b.  Supplier’s perception of the buyer’s capability to achieve 
contracted product or service performance objectives is an important influential 
factor in determining the supplier-side risk position. 
Finding.  Supported 
  
Many buyers expressed their belief that the proper sequence should be to 
accurately identify requirements then evaluate capabilities of potential suppliers.  Here 
buyers assign risk based on the perception of the supplier’s capabilities as demonstrated 
through past performance.  Suppliers identified the accuracy of the buyer’s performance 
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objectives as the primary influence on supplier-side risk position.  Clearly stated 
performance objectives were found to reduce the supplier’s perception of risk.  
 
Proposition 4a. Buyer’s responsibility for achieving intra-firm financial 
objectives is an important influential factor in determining the buyer-side risk 
position.  
 
Finding.  Supported 
 
 
Proposition 4b. Supplier’s responsibility for achieving intra-firm financial 
objectives is an important influential factor in determining the supplier-side risk 
position. 
 
Finding.  Supported 
 
 For buyers, the key focus is to ensure the best product or service is acquired 
which meets specific intra-firm financial objectives.  This may be achieved by working 
closely with suppliers to reduce cost.  Suppliers primarily focus on protecting or 
preserving the ability to meet intra-firm financial objectives through the use of detailed 
contracts. 
 
Proposition 5.  Buyer-supplier perceptions of collective risk position directly 
influences desired contract duration. 
 Finding.  Supported 
  
Both buyers and suppliers see long-term contracts as a critical foundation for 
addressing highly complex or uncertain supply chain characteristics.  However, there are 
fundamental differences between buyers and suppliers concerning contract structure and 
contract duration.  Buyers suggest contract structure is selected prior to determining 
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contract duration.  Suppliers would prefer buyers determine the contract duration prior to 
selecting the contract structure.  Suppliers are concerned with the ability of the contract 
structure to afford them the opportunity to minimize risks which may be inherently 
involved in shorter duration contracts.  Findings suggest that suppliers perceive that 
longer term contracts reduce supplier side risks and may at the same time reduce buyer-
side costs.  
 
Proposition 6.  A long-term buyer-supplier contract enables supplier-side strategic 
investment. 
Finding.  Supported    
  
Suppliers believe shorter term contracts do not support supplier-side strategic 
investment.  Suppliers stated that shorter term contracts do not provide the supplier the 
opportunities to hedge against risks and achieve the needed return on investment.  Buyers 
stated that short-term contracts serve to expand the supplier base, increase competition 
and reduce buyer-side costs.  In contrast, suppliers perceive short-term contracts as more 
expensive and as impediments to supplier-side investment which, if made, could 
significantly improve their ability to achieve contract performance objectives and reduce 
buyer-side costs over time.  Findings suggest suppliers need the duration of the contract 
to be greater than three years, ideally five to seven years, in order to make supplier-side 
innovative investments.   
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6.1.2  Chapter 4, Academic Paper #2 – Buyer Beware: Nearshoring, 
Reshoring and Insourcing—Moving Beyond the Total Cost of Ownership Discussion 
  
In this chapter, risks associated with the use of total cost of ownership (TCO) 
models in the evaluation of outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decisions 
are identified and examined.  The literature identifies TCO as a preferred approach for 
evaluating nearshoring, reshoring or insourcing opportunities.  However, the findings of 
this research suggest TCO does not address many of the engineering and supply chain 
complexities which have been shown to negatively affect the firm’s ability to achieve its 
manufacturing relocation objectives. 
 This research describes three types of outsourced manufacturing relationships and 
the potential risks which would not be identified using only a TCO model in considering 
opportunities to relocate the outsourced manufacturing function.  The manufacturing 
relationship types, the focal firm’s degree of control or influence, and potential risks are 
discussed below. 
Custom Manufacturing.  The purpose of this relationship was found to be focused 
on having a manufacturer produce a component or end-item in accordance with the focal 
firm’s specific product design, engineering and manufacturing specifications, and 
preferred manufacturing processes.  In this relationship, the focal firm retains a very high 
degree of control or influence over the manufacturing standards or metrics, and 
production quality control metrics.  Research findings suggest that focal firms 
overestimate the level of detailed knowledge they have concerning the manufacturer’s 
processes during the manufacturing relocation decision process.  There were two major 
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findings discovered associated with this relationship type.  First, focal firms did not have 
an awareness of the degree to which the outsourced manufacturer had absorbed 
manufacturing-related costs (i.e., scrap and re-work) in order to meet the focal firm’s 
quality and costs objectives.  Second, focal firms were not aware of the degree to which 
their outsourced manufacturers had become reliant on the use of non-standard processes 
(e.g., manufacturing or production ‘work-arounds’) in order to minimize manufacturing 
costs and maximize profit. 
Customization of Standard Parts.  In this relationship the focal firm engages with 
a manufacturer of standardized products from which the focal firm seeks to customize 
one or more of the products in the manufacturer’s product portfolio.  While the 
manufacturer owns the foundational product design, engineering specifications, etc., it is 
the focal firm’s customization of the standardized product(s) which affords the firm a 
limited degree of control or influence over the range of process elements.  Research 
findings suggest the focal firm may be challenged to evaluate relocation opportunities 
because of limitations to the manufacturer’s foundational product design, engineering and 
manufacturing specifications, and production processes.  The findings indicate firms 
engaged in this type relationship who relocate outsourced manufacturing functions may 
face design and integration issues without access to foundational product information. 
Standardized Parts.  Here an outsourced manufacturer primarily produces 
standardized products which are sold under one or more brands into multiple markets.  
The focal firm has very little, if any, control or influence over the manufacturing and 
production processes.  Risks in this type relationship may include the limited disclosure 
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by the manufacturer of the product design, manufacturing and production processes.  As 
a result, manufacturing relocation decisions are primarily based on the availability of 
qualified suppliers (i.e., suitable form, fit and function) in the market and the costs to 
switch suppliers.   
Three management approaches are provided which may improve the availability 
of or access to the timely, accurate and complete information needed to support 
evaluation of manufacturing relocation opportunities. 
 
6.1.3  Chapter 5, Academic Paper #3 – An Empirical Investigation of the 
Manufacturing Outsourcing-to-Insourcing Antecedents 
 
This research stream examines the level of perceived influence 23 different 
factors may have on manufacturing relocation decisions.  Researchers have exhaustively 
evaluated these factors in the context of outsourcing.  However, to date, there has been no 
examination of these factors concerning their influence on the outsourcing-to-insourcing 
manufacturing relocation decision.  Each of the 23 influential factors is evaluate and then 
organized into three categories based on the level influence senior executives and 
managers perceive each factor to have on manufacturing relocation decision.  The 6 
factors aligned with the Tactical Influences category have been identified as having the 
most significant influence on a firm’s outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation 
decision.  The three categories are provided below and include a listing of those 
influential factors which research participants identified as meeting the defined criteria. 
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Tactical Influences.  These influential factors are those closely linked to firm-
level achievement of near-term customer service, financial management, 
production, and resource utilization goals. 
Factors:  Cost Reduction, Performance Consequences, Improve Productivity, 
Need for Expertise, and Quality 
 
Strategic Influences.  Factors for which the firm’s managers develop and position 
resources in response to anticipated changes in internal or external conditions. 
Factors: Focus on Core Competencies, Service Improvement, Supplier Market 
Power, Technical Advances, Global Supply Chain Risks, Outsourcing Risks, Just-
in-Time Complexities, Supply Chain Infrastructure Investment, Regulatory 
Change and Rapid Growth 
 
Enabling Influences.  Factors which support achievement of the firm’s long-term 
intra- or inter-firm objectives. 
Factors:  Leverage Supply Chain Management, Supply Chain Integration, 
Contract Strategy, Human Resources, Proprietary Systems Profitability, 
Globalization of Business, Integration of Information Technologies, and Upgrade 
Information Technologies. 
  
  The findings indicate that primary reasons for outsourcing and insourcing are the 
same.  Firms make sourcing decisions which best position the firm to minimize cost, 
improve quality, and increase productivity and performance.  The interviews with senior 
executives and managers suggest that most insourcing decisions are in response to an 
external trigger event (e.g., erosion of quality or cost increases).  Key differences 
between outsourcing and insourcing appear to be largely associated with those factors 
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classified as Enabling Influences.  Unlike outsourcing, firms did not consider the 
Enabling Influences to be significant in the manufacturing relocation decision.  This is 
most likely due to the characteristics of the Enabling Influences factors which imply the 
need for longer term perspectives and potentially financial investments for the firm.     
  
6.2  Implications for the United States Air Force 
 This research identified several issues considered relevant the United States Air 
Force (USAF).  As identified in Chapter 3, contract structure and duration are significant 
issues for suppliers.  The USAF should investigate the current structure and duration of 
its contracts, particularly those contracts which cover outsourced manufacturing or 
production functions which may be considered for insourcing.  The USAF may discover 
that the structure and duration of its contracts are inhibiting the supplier’s willingness to 
make innovative investments which could benefit both the USAF and supplier. 
 In Chapter 4 total cost of ownership (TCO) was identified as an insufficient 
approach for evaluating current outsourced relationships and does not provide decision 
makers with the detailed information needed to evaluate insourcing opportunities.  The 
USAF should identify the type of outsourced manufacturing relationship it has with its 
suppliers.  The type of relationship may largely dictate the degree of control or influence 
the USAF has in the relationship and, in-turn, its access to the critical engineering and 
supply chain information needed to support an insourcing decision. 
 Chapter 5 identified the primary factors which have the highest level of influence 
on an insourcing decision.  The USAF should ensure that the detail associated with each 
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of these five primary factors is fully developed and evaluated prior to engaging in an 
outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing relocation decision making process. 
 The framework below (Figure 15) should be used to guide relocation discussions.  
We found that firms who utilized vertically and horizontally integrated teams, including 
suppliers, were better prepared to evaluate outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing 
relocation opportunities.   
 
Figure 15 - Relocation Evaluation Framework  
 
The framework in Figure 15 ties together the implications of contract duration and 
supplier-side investment identified Chapter 3, manufacturing process complexity factors 
and the focal firm-manufacturer relationship issues addressed in Chapter 4, and the need 
for decision makers to fully develop the influential factors influencing an insourcing 
decision as discussed in Chapter 5.  Collectively, the framework provides decision 
makers and their teams with the overarching information nodes which need to be 
completely evaluated prior to entering into an outsourcing-to-insourcing manufacturing 
relocation decision. 
 
 
 
 
Evaluate contract duration and 
structure
Indentify factors influencing the 
insourcing decision
Determine outsourced 
manufacturer relationship type
Does the contract enable supplier-
side innovative investment?
Does the relationship type ensure 
access to engineering and supply 
chain information?
Will insourcing the function 
achieve these objectives?
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Appendix A – Semi-structured Interview Guide 
The following questions will be used as a framework to guide participants through the 
interview process.  Additionally, the researcher may ask follow-on questions in order to 
afford participants an opportunity to provide additional information that clarifies or 
supports the participants’ response.      
 
 
RQ1:  How are outsourced functions managed? 
 
 
 
 
RQ2:  How does this management approach influence an insourcing decision? 
 
 
 
 
RQ3:  How does the duration of the buyer-supplier contract influence an insourcing 
decision? 
 
 
 
 
RQ4:  How do the following factors influence an insourcing decision?                 
Table 1. Influential Factors 
 
Factor
Contract Strategy 0 1 2 3 4 5
Cost Reduction 0 1 2 3 4 5
Focus on Core Competencies 0 1 2 3 4 5
Global Supply Chain Risks 0 1 2 3 4 5
Globalization of Business 0 1 2 3 4 5
Human Resources 0 1 2 3 4 5
Improve Productivity 0 1 2 3 4 5
Integration of Information Technologies 0 1 2 3 4 5
Just-in-Time Complexities 0 1 2 3 4 5
Leverage Supply Chain Management 0 1 2 3 4 5
Need for Expertise 0 1 2 3 4 5
Outsourcing Risks 0 1 2 3 4 5
Performance Consequences 0 1 2 3 4 5
Proprietary Systems Profitability 0 1 2 3 4 5
Quality 0 1 2 3 4 5
Rapid Growth 0 1 2 3 4 5
Regulatory Change 0 1 2 3 4 5
Service Improvement 0 1 2 3 4 5
Supplier Market Power 0 1 2 3 4 5
Supply Chain Infrastructure Investment 0 1 2 3 4 5
Supply Chain Integration 0 1 2 3 4 5
Technical Advances 0 1 2 3 4 5
Upgrade Information Technology 0 1 2 3 4 5
Other: 0 1 2 3 4 5
Other: 0 1 2 3 4 5
(Low)          Influential Rating          (High)
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RQ5:  How are insourcing decisions made? 
 
 
 
 
RQ6:  How are insourcing decisions implemented? 
 
 
 
 
RQ7:  How does implementing an insourcing decision impact management operations? 
 
 
 
 
RQ8:  How have strategic business objectives, purchasing strategies or infrastructure 
investment plans changed as a result of implementing an insourcing decision? 
 
 
 
 
RQ9:  How is the success of an insourcing decision measured?   
 
 
 
 
RQ10:  How does insourcing affect key Supply Base Performance Factors? 
Table 2: Insourcing Affects 
 
 
Factor
Expected 
Improvement
Baseline 
Defined
Target 
Defined
Current 
Status
Overall Expected 
% Improvement
Time to Achieve 
Expected 
Improvement
Availability or Capacity Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Communication and Information Sharing Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Delivery and Transportation Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Dependability Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Flexibility Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Inventory Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Quality Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Risk or Uncertainty Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Service or Responsiveness Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Technology and Innovation Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Time or Speed Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Unit Price Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Management Costs Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Supply Chain Complexity Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Other: Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Other: Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
Other: Yes  /  No Yes  /  No Yes  /  No >   /   <   /   = %
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Appendix B – Case Study Worksheet 
 
1.  Company Name:
2.  Insourcing Case Description
2a.  How long had the Product / Service been outsourced?
<1 yr 1-3 yrs 3-5 yrs 5-10 yrs >10 yrs
2b.  Where was the outsourced Product / Service supplier located?
Canada Mexico Europe Pacific Rim Other
2c.  How was this outsourced Product / Service managed? Please describe.
Not Managed Informally Managed Formally Managed
3.  re: RQ4 --What factor(s) predominantly influenced the insourcing decision?
4.  re: RQ5 --how was the insourcing decision made?  Please describe.
5.  re: RQ6 --how was the insourcing decision implemented?  Please describe.
6.  re: RQ9 --how was the success of the insourcing decision measured?  Please describe.
7.  Please address any managerial implications revealed as a result of this insourcing case.
8.  Please address any 'lessons learned' as a result of this insourcing case.
AFIT Ph.D. Dissertation Research: Case Study Worksheet
Locally
(within 90 miles)
Regionally
(within same region)
Outside of Region
Formal Process / Approach Informal Process / Approach
Final Product Subassembly Component Service
(within US)
Outside CONUS
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Appendix C – Curriculum Vita 
 
Education 
Ph.D. Air Force Institute of Technology (June, 2013) 
            School of Engineering and Management 
            Department of Operational Sciences 
            Major: Logistics Minors: Systems Engineering and Statistics 
 
Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Scholar 
Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies (CAPS) Scholar 
International Federation of Purchasing and Supply Management (IFPSM) Scholar 
 
Dissertation: “The Outsourcing-to-Insourcing Relocation Shift: A Response of 
U.S. Manufacturers to the Outsourcing Paradigm.” Advisor: J. A. Ogden. 
 
M.A. University of Dayton (1998) 
           Major: International Affairs 
 
M.S. Air Force Institute of Technology (1997) 
 Major: Acquisition and Logistics Management 
 Thesis: “International Armaments Cooperation in the Post Cold-war Era.”  
Advisor: C. M. Brandt 
 
United States Air Force Historical Foundation Outstanding Thesis Award 
Sigma Iota Epsilon 
 
B.S. University of Maryland (1990) 
 Major: Business Management 
 
 
Research and Teaching Interests 
Global Supply Chain Operations, Outsourcing to Insourcing Complexities, Re-shoring 
Manufacturing Supply Chains, Supply Chain Analytics, IT-enabled Supply Chains, Supply 
Financial Analysis, Production and Operations Scheduling, Supply Chain Contracts, Performance 
Based Logistics, Strategic Supplier Development, Organizational Strategy, Logistics and Supply 
Chain Workforce Development. 
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